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ANTONY'S ORIENTAL POLICY 
UNTIL THE DEFEAT OF THE 
PARTHIAN EXPEDITION 



THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI STUDIES 

VOLUME III, NUMBER 2 



SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES 

George Leeevre, Editor 



ANTONY'S ORIENTAL POLICY UNTIL 

THE DEFEAT OF THE PARTHIAN 

EXPEDITION 

LuciLE Craven, Ph. D. 




UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI 

COLUMBIA, MISSOURI 

1920 



.en 



(.'^ 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1 Page 
Antonyms First Experience in the Orient 1 

CHAPTER II 
Conditions in the East 11 

CHAPTER HI 
Antony's Provincial Administration 20 

CHAPTER IV 
Antony in Egypt Z7 

CHAPTER V 
The Preparation for the Parthian Expedition 51 

CHAPTER VI 
The Parthian Expedition 66 



PREFACE 

This work was begun under the direction of Mr, A. T. Olm- 
stead, now Professor of History in the University of IlHnois, 
and of Mr. Walter Miller, Professor of Latin, now engaged in 
Y. M. C. A. work in Italy. The work was completed under the 
supervision of Mr. H. W. Wright, of the department of Latin, 
Mr. W. G. Manly, Professor of Greek, and Mr. Jesse E. Wrench, 
Assistant Professor of History. I am glad to have this oppor- 
tunity to acknowledge their valuable suggestions and kindly crit- 
icism. Mr. W. A. Oldf ather. Professor of the Classics in the Uni- 
versity of Illinois, and Mr. F. W. Shipley, Professor of Latin in 
Washington University, kindly furnished publications that were 
not available here. I wish to acknowledge this kindness as well 
as their helpful suggestions. 

May, 1918 L. C. 



INTRODUCTION * 

The purpose of this dissertation has at no time been to white- 
wash the personal character of Antony, but to point out that his 
general policy in the Orient corresponded in a large measure to 
that of the average Roman governor. 

Antony seems to have been actuated not by a high ambition 
for a great empire in the East, on the one hand, nor, on the other, 
by the capricious gratification of his desires or by an infatuation 
for Cleopatra. His aim, as it seems, was supreme power at 
Rome. Under Caesar's influence for a long period, Antony had 
come to regard the East as the proper sphere for Roman aggres- 
sion. He realized that to establish his power at Rome on a stable 
foundation some brilliant and lucrative enterprise was necessary. 
Viewed in this light, the Parthian expedition was a bid for pop- 
ularity at Rome. To regain the standards lost by Crassus would 
bring prestige at Rome, and to re-establish the authority of Rome 
in the East would put provincial administration on a firm basis 
conducive to financial prosperity. Egypt was to finance the ex- 
pedition through an alliance between Antony and Cleopatra. It 
was only with the defeat of the Parthian expedition that Antony 
seems to have changed his aim for supreme power at Rome to 
the hope for a kingdom in the East with Egypt at its head. 



*This paper was accepted as a dissertation by the Graduate Faculty 
of the University of Missouri in May, 1918, in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 



CHAPTER I 

Antony's first experience in the orient 

For a comprehensive study of Antony's relations to the 
Orient, it is necessary to take up in some detail the proconsulship 
of Gabinius in Syria, for it was as commander of the cavalry that 
Antony first became acquainted with the problems of the land 
which was to play so important a part in his later life. At the 
expiration of his consulship, Gabinius succeeded to Syria (57 
B. C.). On account of the disturbed conditions there, Rome be- 
gan to appoint for this country proconsuls with the power to levy 
troops and to engage in war. The first of these sent out was 
Gabinius.^ When en route for his province, he was joined by 
Antony as commander of the cavalry .^ 

Their military campaign lay in Judaea.^ Until the time of 
Pompey, Rome had not directly interfered in Jewish affairs. 
The relation of socius atque amicus had been established as early 
as 166 B. C., when Judas Maccabeus, to strengthen his position 
as first Hasmonean ruler, sent an embassy to Rome to form an 
alliance with that but vaguely known people which was beginning 
to exert such a powerful influence in the East.* Rome, on her 
part, was glad to receive as a socius a people who had held out 

lAppian, Syr. 51. Appian, however, cannot always be relied upon 
for constitutional matters. Vid. Shiirer, Hist. Jews, p. 330 N. 2. 

2Plut. Ant. 3. For some time Antony had been embroiled in the dis- 
turbances of Clodius, but had left Italy for Greece to escape trouble 
from the combinations forming against Clodius at Rome, and was spend- 
ing his time in military training and practice of oratory. Coming at this 
time, the oflfer seemed most opportune, but Antony refused on the ground 
that he did not wish to join the expedition in a private capacity. On his 
appointment as commander of the horse, Antony accepted and set sail 
with Gabinius. 

^Conditions in Judaea are given in detail, for the abundant source 
material shows many phases of Roman policy and provincial administra- 
tion not so well preserved in the records of other nations of the East. 

*! Mace. 8,17; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XII, 5, 8. 

(1) 



2 University of Missouri Studies 

so successfully against the troublesome Antiochus, provided that 
such an alliance entailed no more definite aid than prestige of the 
Roman name. Accordingly, until the time of Pompey, Rome had 
contented herself with vague alliances,^ but by playing one party 
against another, she was imperceptibly establishing her influence 
as predominant. 

On the defeat of Antiochus and the establishment of Syria 
as a province, Rome changed her policy in regard to Judaea and 
interfered more openly in its affairs. There seem to have been 
three distinct parties in Judaea : The Sadducees, or Hellenizing 
aristocracy, distinctly pro-Roman in sentiment; the Pharisees, 
democratic, religious, and somewhat pacifist in tendency; and 
the zealots, or nationalists, strongly pro-Parthian in sympathy.® 
At the head of the pro-Roman party was Antipater,'^ a native of 
Idumea (Idumi), of which he was military governor,^ friend and 
minister of Hyrcanus 11,^ a man who had already recognized 
Rome as a potent factor in Jewish affairs, a factor in which lay 
his chief hope for the realization of his own ambitious designs. 
Thruout Antipater's entire career, he always came forward as the 
champion of Roman interests in Judaea. His first opportunity 
came in the civil war between Hyrcanus, the legitimate heir, and 
his younger but more capable brother, Aristobulus. Backed by 

^Jonathan (I Mace. XII, 1; Joseph. Antiq,. Jud. XIII, 5, 8) and 
Simon (I Mace. XIV, 16; XV, 15-24; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIII, 5, 8.) re- 
newed the aUianee. John Hyrcanus not only renewed the alliance, but 
after a second appeal gained actual interference from Rome in favor of 
Judaea, in that the senate ordered Antiochus to restore territory taken in 
war (Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIII, 9, 2 sq; XIV, 8, 3 sq.) Aristobulus 
and Alexander Jannaeus were able to maintain their power with- 
out Roman alliance (Joseph. Antiq. XIII, 11, 1 sp.). 

6Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms. p. 216. For a detailed 
history of the development of the anti-Hellenistic Jews with Phari- 
sees see Hereford, Phar. pp. 1-57. Radin, p. 155, says he does not 
believe the Pharisees were related to or a continuation of the anti- 
Hellenic Hasadim. 

^Nicolaus of Damascus, F. G. H. Vol. Ill p. 417. 

sjoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 8, 1 ; Bell. Jud. I, 6, 2. 

nud. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 3 

the nationalists, Aristobulus had gained the kingdom and the high 
priesthood/" and had reduced Hyrcanus to the standing of a 
private citizen/^ 

Antipater recognized this opportunity and came to his aid. 
Hyrcanus re-engaged in the struggle with no little success /^ but 
before the quarrel was settled, the Roman general Scaurus ap- 
peared in Syria. Each contestant sent an embassy to him with 
the promise of four hundred talents for a favorable decision. 
Aristobulus succeeded in establishing his power through the in- 
fluence of Scaurus, who felt that Aristobulus was the wealthier 
of the two claimants and consequently the more able to fulfil 
his promises.^^ No one regarded the matter as settled, however, 
for when Pompey arrived in Damascus (B. C. 64) there was a 
renewal of the embassies from Hyrcanus and Aristobulus.^* 
Pompey showed himself a better judge of conditions in Judaea, 
as well as a truer exponent of Roman policy, by supporting the 
weaker party, lest later on he should find in the ambitious Aris- 
tobulus a man unwilling to submit to Rome's domination in the 
internal affairs of Judaea, The influence of the politic Antipater 
must have had weight with Pompey in his decision. Aristobulus, 
however, defied the Roman authority. He made his final stand 
on the Temple Mount, where he was besieged for three months, 
until, by an attack on the Sabbath, the fortress fell and the Holy 
City came under a Roman commander.^^ 

At Pompey's command the city walls were destroyed, and 
Jerusalem and the surrounding territory made tributary.^® The 
Hellenistic cities of Coele-Syria were taken from Judaea and 

lojoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 3, 1; Bell. Jud. XX, 10. 

ii/&tW. XIV, 1, 2; Bell. Jud. I, 6, 1. 

12/feiU XIV, 2, 1-2. 

^Hbid. XIV, 2, 3. 

"Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 3, 2. 

^Hbid. XIV, 4, 2-4; Bell. Jud. I, 7, 3-5; Dio, XXXVII, 16; 
Strabo, 16, 2, 40; Uv. Bpit. 102; Tac. Hist. V 9; Appian, Syr. 50; 
Mith. 106. 

lejoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4, 4; Bell. Jud. I, 7, 6. The tribute 
was levied on the Jews as a people, not on Hyrcanus as a ruler. 
Ibid. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4, 4 sq. Bell. Jud. I, 7, 6; Dio, XXXIX, 56, 6. 



4 University of Missouri Studies 

added to the province of Syria." The contracted Jewish terri- 
tory was given to Hyrcanus II, who was recognized as high priest 
without the title of king.^^ Judaea itself seems to have been un- 
der the general supervision of the Syrian proconsul.^^ Pompey 
took Aristobulus and his children as prisoners to Rome, where 
they were led in his triumph.^" Pompey had not crushed the 
nationalist party, however. Alexander, the son of Aristobulus, 
had escaped from Pompey. At the coming of Gabinius (57 B, 
C), he was rallying the anti-Roman element to his standard with 
great success. Indeed he had gone so far as to come to Jerusa- 
lem and to begin to rebuild the walls. On hearing that Gabinius 
was advancing in Judaea, Alexander quickly assembled and arm- 
ed his forces and fortified Alexandrium, Hyrcanium, and 
Macherus.2^ Gabinius sent Antony in advance to arm the pro- 
Roman Jews and the Idumeans whom Antipater had collected in 
pursuance of his policy of establishing his own position firmly by 
making himself indispensable to the Romans.^^ Through the con- 
fidence that Gabinius thus placed in him, Antony was enabled to 
become acquainted with the leaders of the pro-Roman Jews. 
Josephus says that he even formed a guest friendship with An- 
tipater at this time.^^ When Gabinius came up, Alexander was 
defeated in battle near Jerusalem and retreated with what re- 
mained of his forces to Alexandrium.^* For his distinguished 
services in the first attack on this fortress, Gabinius left Antony 



"Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4, 4 ; Bell. Jud. I, 7, 6-7. 

isjoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 4, 4; Bell. Jud. I, 7, 6-7. 

i9Amm. Marc. XIV, 8, 12; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 79. 

2o/6td. XIV, 4, 5; Bell. Jud. I, 7, 7. According to Morrison, 
Jews under Roman Rule, p. 27, Psalm VIII, 16-26 refers to Pom- 
pey. 

^^Ihid. XIV, 6, 2 ; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 2 ; Zonar. V, 7. 

22Hegissip. I, 19. Cf. article Gabinius in Pauly-Wissowa. 

23Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 1. The fortress of Alexandrium 
was situated on one of the mountains somewhere between Jerusalem 
and Scythopolis. It seems probable that it can be located as the ruins 
on Qarn Sartabeh. Cf. Schmidt, Alexandrvum, Journal of Bibl. Lit. 
78 sq. 

24Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 1; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 3; Zonar. V, 7. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 5 

in charge of the siege while he himself made a tour of Judaea.^^ 
On his return the siege was pressed with vigor until Alexandrium 
surrendered.^® In this campaign Antony had had an opportunity 
to learn the political factions at work in Judaea, to see the ad- 
vantage to Rome in fostering the interest of the Idumean fam- 
ily, and, in Gabinius' subsequent reorganization of Judaea, to ob- 
serve the methods of organization employed by a Roman gov- 
ernor in his provincial administration. 

In this work Gabinius followed the policy established by 
Pompey, that of reducing the large powers that were developing, 
by breaking their territory up into smaller units.^'^ Accordingly, 
he divided Judaea into five districts with a Sanhedrin^^ in each, 
which held the governing power.^^ Hyrcanus was deprived of 
political power and as high priest dictated to the Jews in religious 
matters alone. Rome was always opposed to small theocratic 
states having extensive territory governed and taxed by the 
priests of the Temple. Strabo^° cites several other instances 
of this Roman policy of diminishing the power and privileges of 
the priest.^^ 

The anti-Roman element was still restive. Under the lead- 
ership of Aristobulus, who had escaped from Rome, a second re- 
volt arose. Pitholaus, who had been a Roman lieutenant at 
Jerusalem, deserted to him with a thousand men. Their first 

25joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 5, 3; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 4. On this tour 
Gabinius gave orders for the rebuilding of such cities as had been de- 
stroyed. Among them were Samaria, Ashdod, Scythopolis, Anthedron, 
Raphia, and Dora. 

26Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 5, 4; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 5. 

27Hegissip. I, 19. 

28Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 5, 4. This is the first mention of the 
Sanhedrin in Josephus. The supreme court of justice had probably been 
called the Sanhedrin for some time, but after the settlement of Gabinius 
the court at Jerusalem was known as the "Great Sanhedrin" as a distin- 
guishing mark. Cf. Hastings, Diet. Bib. IV, p. 397, Art. Sanhedrin. 

29The capitals were at Jerusalem, Amathus, Jericho, Sapphoris, and 
Gadara. Joseph, Antiq. Jud. XIV, 5, 4. For a summary of the reorgan- 
ization of Judaea, vid. Sands, Rom. Client Princes, Appendix A. XV. 

30Strabo, XII, 8, 14; XII, 3, 37. 

3iCf. Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 227. 



6 University of Missouri Studies 

plan was to fortify Alexandrium, but at the advance of the Rom- 
an forces under Sisenna, Servihus, and Antony, Aristobulus re- 
treated to Macherus/^ the second fortress of Judaea after Jeru- 
salem, according to Pliny.^^ Here again Antony distinguished 
himself for valiant conduct.^* Aristobulus was taken prisoner 
and sent back to Rome.^^ With the anti-Roman Jews temporari- 
ly in check, Gabinius turned his attention toward the Parthians.^® 

Mithridates, king of Parthia, had declared war on Armenia 
to regain Gordyene.^^ Since this territory had been granted to 
Armenia by Pompey, such action was an encroachment upon the 
authority of Rome. Mithridates met with some success,^® but 
civil strife in Parthia soon put a different aspect on affairs. 
Mithridates was driven from the throne on account of the cruelty 
of his rule.^^ Orodes, his brother, however, granted him the 
government of Media ; but, when this too was taken from him,*° 
he sought refuge with Gabinius, who now continued the war 
begun by Mithridates, with the expectation of achieving lasting 
fame in establishing Mithridates on the throne as a client prince 
of Rome.*^ Gabinius had just passed the Euphrates when he re- 
ceived instructions from Pompey to give up this expedition and 
to reinstate Ptolemy Auletes on the throne.*^ 

Antony was to have an opportunity to gain first hand 
knowledge of one of Rome's most serious problems. The set- 
tlement of the Egyptian question was one of the most important 
political tasks of Rome. It was taken more and more into con- 

32Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 1 ; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 6. 

^m. H. V, 72. 

34Plut. Ant. 3; Hegesipp. I, 19-20. 

35Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 1; Bell. Jud. 18, 6; Zonar. V, 7; Dio, 
XXXIX, 56, 6; Strabo, XVII, 11, 11. 

36Since Gabinius did not complete his Parthian campaign, the dis- 
cussion of the Parthian question will be taken up later. 

"Just. XLII, 4. 

38Cf. RawUnson, Parth., p. 147, n. 4. 

39Just., XLII, 4. 

40Dio, XXXIX, 56. 

*iAppian, Syr. 51. 

42Dio, XXXIX, 55, 56 ; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 2. 



ANTONy's Oriental Policy 7 

sideration by each of the great leaders in turn, until it was finally 
settled by Octavian.*^ 

In 65 B. C. Caesar and Crassus had looked to Egypt as a 
base in which to establish their power while Pompey was other- 
wise engaged. They tried to have a measure passed by a ple- 
biscite granting to Caesar, for the purpose of settling affairs in 
Egypt, a command extraordinary, such as Pompey had held. 
Here he was to create for himself a military and political posi- 
tion — a conterpoise of the Democrats to the power of the Opti- 
mates, represented by Pompey and his army.** The united power 
of Caesar and Crassus, however, failed to overcome the hostile 
influence of the Senate. The Senate did not wish to entangle 
itself by forming into a province a land with such economic ad- 
vantages, for by commanding its financial organization and naval 
power to his own use, a strong governor would be but a step from 
monarchical power.*^ Consequently the question was dropped 
for the time being. 

After the triumvirate had been renewed at Lucca, it seems 
that an agreement must have been made by the triumvirs as to 
Egypt. The very fact that Gabinius, already launched with 
seeming success upon a Parthian campaign, would, at a sugges- 
tion from Pompey, immediately drop his own alluring plans, 
points to the fact that the triumvirate had in all probability se- 
lected the staunch Pompeian, Gabinius, as Syrian proconsul with 
the Egyptian question in view. His value as a tool had been 
demonstrated in his work on the Gabinian law. Ptolemy, who 
had purchased his first recognition as sovereign at a price of 
six thousand talents,*^ had agreed to a further payment of ten 

43Cf. Neise, Rom. Geschichte, pp. 229, 235, 248, cited by von Mess, 
Caesar, p. 29, n. 44. 

4*Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Hist., Vol. IV, p. 201; Adolph von Mess, 
Caesar, pp. 29, 30 ; MahaflFy, Hist. Egypt, p. 228. 

*5C£. Mommsen, Rom. Hist., Vol. IV, p. 67; von Mess, Caesar, pp. 
29, 30. Suet. Caes. 35 states that Caesar kept Egypt under the rule of 
Cleopatra, for fear that under a headstrong governor the province would 
become a source of revolution. 

*6Suet, Caes. 54. 



8 University of Missouri Studies 

thousand talents for his restoration.*^ The Senate, however, 
passed no decree giving Gabinius authority to wage offensive war 
outside his province, and even brought forward a prediction from 
the Sibylhne books forbidding such action.*^ Perhaps this ac- 
counts for Gabinius' hesitancy, for Plutarch says that most of 
the officers, as well as Gabinius himself, were opposed to the en- 
terprise, but that Antony joined in persuading Gabinius. Plu- 
tarch assigns Antony's eagerness to a longing for great exploits 
and a desire to gratify Ptolemy's request.*^ Perhaps Antony 
felt that the surest way of advancement for a young man at Rome 
was to cater to the wishes of the great political leaders until his 
own position was somewhat assured. Accordingly, Gabinius 
made a pretext of the alleged support of piracy by the Egyptians 
and the building of a fleet by Archelaus to start immediately for 
the Egyptian frontier,^" 

The most dangerous point in the expedition was the march 
through the sandy desert between Gaza and Pelusium, where no 
fresh water could be obtained. Antony was sent ahead to make 
himself master of the passes and to win Pelusium. By his emi- 
nent success he rendered the march safe for the army.^^ In the 
military engagements following, Antony was rewarded with es- 
special marks of distinction for bravery in action.^^ 

On his recall to Judaea by the renewed uprisings of the anti- 
Roman Jews,^^ soon after the final defeat of the Egyptians, 

47Plut. Ant. 3; Dio 39, 55-58; Appian, B. C. II, 24; Joseph. Antiq. 
Jud. XIV, 6, 2; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 7; Cic. Pro. Rab. Post. VIII, 22; Plut. 
Cat. Min., 35. 

*8Appian, B. C. II, 24; Syr. 51. 

49Plut. Ant. 3. 

soStrabo, XII, 3, 34; Cic. pro. Rab. Post. VIII; Phil. II, 19. 

sijoseph. Antiq. Jud., XIV, 6, 2, attributes this entirely to the in- 
fluence of Antipater; but here, as in regard to the aid rendered Caesar 
in the Bellum Alexandrinum, he probably has exaggerated the importance 
of the services of Antipater, for he is not mentioned by Plutarch in this 
instance nor by the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum in the case of 
Caesar. 

52Plut. Ant. 3. 

53Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 2 ; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 7. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 9 

Gabinius left a garrison of Roman troops in Alexandria to main- 
tain the authority of Ptolemy.^* Antony also probably remained 
in Alexandria for some time, for Josephus makes no mention of 
him in the subsequent campaign in Syria.^^ By assuming many 
of the prerogatives of the palace guards, these troops which were 
left in Alexandria became a powerful factor there. It is impor- 
tant to note that it was among these troops that Antony had won 
a great name for personal valor and military ability in his conduct 
of the campaign at Pelusium. The populace of Alexandria like- 
wise honored him for his clemency toward the Egyptians after 
the victory.^^ 

In these years in which Antony had been with Gabinius he 
had had unusual opportunities to become acquainted with three 
of Rome's great problems in the East: Judaea, Parthia, and 
Egypt. First, in his stay in Judaea he could see the strong anti- 
Roman party dependent on the Hasmonean house for its leaders. 
That this party was strongly pro-Parthian was a fact little real- 
ized by Rome. Actual experience in Judaea seemed to be 
requisite for a comprehension of the hearty support that the 
Parthians gave every Syrian state against Rome. After Antony's 
early experience in Judaea, he could judge the value of the 
Idumean family in furthering Roman interests ; he could observe 
in the work of Gabinius the tasks which lay before a governor 
in dealing with such conditions. 

While the expedition against the Parthians had been of 
short duration, Antony had at least become acquainted with 
Parthian modes of warfare, had heard some discussion as to 
routes to be pursued, and had seen the advantage to Rome of 
the constant intrigue in the Parthian court. The experience 
gained on this expedition, combined with the knowledge acquired 

54Val. Max. IV, i, 15; Caes. B. C. Ill, 103; Dio, XLII, 5. 

ssAppian, B. C. V, 8, states that Antony met Cleopatra and became 
infatuated with her, although she was only about fourteen years of age. 
The early maturity of the peoples of the East must be taken into con- 
sideration, however. Appian's statement is one of interest rather than of 
importance. 

sepiut. Ant. 3. 



10 University of Missouri Studies 

in Judaea, enabled Antony to judge the importance which Parthia 
held in the Orient, a place not sufficiently recognized by the 
Roman leaders. With all this in mind after the Ides of March 
he was able to appreciate at the moment more than any other 
man the value of Caesar's plans for an Oriental campaign.^^ 

In the Egyptian expedition he had seen the economic and 
political condition of Egypt at first hand, the dominating part that 
Alexandria played in Egyptian affairs, the dominating place that 
the mob and the palace soldiery held in Alexandria, and especial- 
ly the vast financial resources of the rulers. All of this knowl- 
edge was to stand him in good stead in his later work in the 
Orient. 

s^It is strange that Ferrero has not noted the probable influence on 
Antony of this campaign with Gabinius. He merely mentions that Antony 
was an officer with Gabinius. Greatness and Decline of Rome, II, p. 64. 



CHAPTER II 



CONDITIONS IN THE LAST 



After Philippi (October, 42 B. C.) the position of Antony 
was assured, since the soldiers considered that the victory was 
due largely to him, on account of Octavian's illness at the time 
of the battle.^ Accordingly, his was the deciding voice in the ar- 
rangements which followed. He chose the East.^ Moreover, he 
took Gallia Narbonensis from Lepidus and retained Gallia Co- 
mata and Cis-Alpine Gaul, which he held by a previous arrange- 
ment of the triumvirs.^ It is important to note that he retained 
these large interests in the West. 

It seems hardly probable that Antony had a dream of a great 
empire such as had been the hope of the great leaders of the East 
since the time of Alexander; nor, on the other hand, did he 
choose the East for the easy indulgence of his sometimes exag- 
gerated sensuality. He was a faithful pupil of Caesar, under 
whom he had served in Gaul as a trusted lieutenant, at the out- 
break of the civil war as champion of his interests, at Pharsalia 
as commander of the left wing, during Caesar's absence from 
Italy as his special representative in Rome, and on his death as 
custodian of his papers. Under Caesar's influence for so long 
a time, Antony must have come to regard the East as the proper 
sphere of Roman aggression. In the East were highly cultivated 
lands, important trade routes from the Orient, and wealthy cities 
famed for commerce and manufacture. From an economic view- 
point Syria especially was second only to Egypt in importance. 
Although, by means of irrigation, agriculture throve in these 
highly cultivated lands, it was in manufactures that Syria laid 

lAppian, B. C. IV, 108; V, 14; Suet. Aug. 13. 

2Eutrop. VII, 3; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 2; Liv. Bpit. CXXV; 
Strabo, XVII, 1, 12. 

3Dio, XLVI, 55; Appian, B. C. IV, 2. For a discussion of the divi- 
sion of the provinces vid. Ganter, Prov. Verw., pp. 1-8. 

(11) 



12 University of Missouri Studies 

her chief claim to riches.* The seaports were commercial centers, 
not only for their own products but also for the great quantities 
of goods brought along the Euphrates trade routes.^ When 
Cicero says that the land of Asia is so fertile that in the produc- 
tivity of its fields, in the variety of its produce, in the extent of 
its pasture lands, and in the diversity of its exports it excels all 
other lands, can we wonder then that he should maintain that 
in the East were Rome's largest and most certain revenues upon 
which her very life depended ?® Antony needed money. In addi- 
tion to the vast sums required for the maintenance of their pow- 
er, the triumvirs owed five thousand drachmae to each soldier. 
To collect this money was one of Antony's tasks,^ but before 
regular payments could be assured, steps had to be taken to re- 
establish Roman administration in the East, so completely disor- 
ganized had it become during the years of the civil wars. To 
re-establish the authority of Rome in that district upon which the 
revenue of the Roman people was so largely dependent was to 
be Antony's greatest work.^ In the accomplishment of this work 
it appears that Antony, instead of establishing kingdoms here 
and there as his fancy dictated, followed a most consistent plan, 
a plan which the great powers of today still employ, that of the 
buffer-state. fWhat could be more in accordance with Roman 
method than to organize the numerous peoples of Syria and Asia 
Minor^ into buffer-states against the power of Parthia and to 
insure the safety of these states against the inroads of this coun- 

*Sidon was famed for her glass manufacture; Tyre, Sarepta, Dora, 
and Caesarea for their purple dyes; Berytes and Tyre for their fine lin- 
ens and silks. 

^Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, pp. 148-152. 

6Cic. Ad. Fam. XV, 1 ; Leg, Man. II, VI, VII. The annual tribute 
acquired by Pompey in the East was 35,000,000 drachmae. Before this 
the entire annual revenue of Rome had been 50,000,000 (Plutarch, Pomp. 
45. Cf. Tenney Frank, Rom. Imp. p. 327). 

7Plut. Ant. 23; Appian, B. C.Y,3; Dio, XLVIII, 30. 

sVell. Pat. II, 74; Suet. Aug. XIII. 

9The term Asia Minor is first found in Oros. I, 2 (about 410 A. D.) ; 
the Ancients used the term "On this side of the Taurus." Cf. Bevan, 
House of Seleucus, Vol. I, p. 76. 



Antont's Oriental Policy 13 

try by a successful predatory raid into its territory? To com- 
prehend the magnitude of the task which lay before him, a con- 
sideration of the complications in Asia Minor and in Syria and 
the forces at work to produce these conditions will be necessary. 

From the earliest times there had been neither a national nor 
a political union in Asia Minor. The Persian subjugation of Asia 
Minor was very incomplete. That empire could never establish 
its power firmly at any great distance from the great highways ; 
consequently, the mountain-peoples continued to obey their he- 
reditary chiefs, with the necessity now and then of furnishing 
troops or tribute to the government. Often, to eliminate trouble 
as far as possible, these chiefs were recognized as the representa- 
tives of the imperial government in return for payment of trib- 
ute. No central government, therefore, was able to form a real 
political union in Asia Minor. 

The Greeks had early replaced, by their highly organized 
network of self-governing cities, the rudimentary social and poli- 
tical organizations, in which as a rule the village was the unit.^° 
While, with a few exceptions along the roads, there were no 
Greek cities more than fifty miles from the coast, these cities 
have been estimated to have been five thousand in number,^^ and 
in many cases rich and populous centers of Greek life and civiliza- 
tion. They were compelled to carry out their administration to a 
large extent with and through these cities. 

In Syria during the last years of the House of Seleucus, the 
actual masters were the Arabian princes of the desert, the Jews, 
the Nabateans, and robber chieftains .^^ In constant conflict with 
one another, these princes had brought Syria to a state of ruin. 
On the coming of Pompey (64 B. C.) the usurpers were set aside, 

loCf. Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 227 ; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 103. 

11 Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 232; Duruy, Hist. Rome, p. 711. 

i^Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV, p. 422. Of the last class, for example, 
was the powerful Ptolemaeus, son of Mennaeus of Chalcis, one of the 
richest men of the period. He ruled over the territory between the 
Lebanon and anti-Lebanon as well as along the lower half of the valley 
of Coele-Syria, including the cities of Heliopolis (Baalbek) and Chalcis. 
He maintained 8000 horsemen at his own expense. 



14 University of Missouri Studies 

the Arabs restricted to their own domain, and the robber chiefs 
forced to give up their strongholds or pay large tribute.^^ Syria, 
with the exception of the cities that were given their freedom and 
districts left to national dynasts under Roman influence, was 
made a Roman province and put under the direct rule of a 
Roman governor.^* The kingdom of the House of Seleucus had 
come to an end.^^ The Roman organization, however, was more 
nominal than real. With civil war raging in Rome, the deposed 
princes appear again to have profited by the general disorgan- 
ization.^^ In the disaffection of these princes was a very real 
danger to the Roman East. On the other side of the Syrian 
desert were Parthians, ever watchful and alert, the hereditary 
enemies of the Greek East and its successor, the Roman Em- 
pire.^'' "When the Romans in the last age of the Republic came 
into immediate contact with Iran, they found in existence the 
Persian empire regenerated by the Parthians. "^^ The latter had 
championed the cause of the Syrian princes in pursuance of their 
policy of strengthening any resistance to the power of Rome. 
Parthia was rapidly becoming a most important factor in the 
Roman policy in the Orient. It was the only great state upon 
which Rome bordered. 

As long as Armenia maintained itself as a power to be feared 
in the Orient, the Parthians had been more or less friendly to the 
Romans^^ as the enemy of their common foe, Tigranes. Pompey 
and Phraates even made an alliance, with the provision that 
Phraates should invade Armenia while Pompey fought Mith- 
ridates, and as a reward Gordyene, which Armenia had seized, 
should be returned to Parthia. After the fall of the Pontic king- 

i3Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 3, 2. 

i^For a discussion of Pompey's work vid. Mommsen, Rom. Hist., 
IV, pp. 400-453. 

i^Bevan, House of Seleucus, II, p. 267; Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV., 
pp. 162-170. 

^^Cassius encouraged many of them in return for money pa3mients. 

I'^Cf. Radin, Jews Among Gks. and Roms., p. 287. 

i^Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 2. Cf. Radin, Jews Among Gks. and 
Rams., p. 267; p. 370. 

"Strabo, XVI, 1, 28. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 15 

dom Pompey, true to the Roman policy of favoring a weakened 
and powerless foe at the expense of an ally who was in a posi- 
tion to become dangerous, left Tigranes in full possession of his 
kingdom, the province of Gordyene included.^" When Phraates 
attempted to seize the province, Pompey's legate Afranius 
promptly drove his troops from the country. Nor did the Rom- 
ans respect the Euphrates as the boundary granted by Lucullus,^^ 
for rulers of Edessa were received under Roman protection. 
Everything seemed to point toward the establishment of the 
great Syro-Mesopotamian desert as a boundary, with Armenia 
in the position of a Roman client state. Permanent peace be- 
tween Parthia and Rome was impossible. "The subsistence side 
by side of great states with equal rights was incompatible with 
the system of Roman policy, we may even say of antiquity in 
general. The Roman empire knew as a limit in the strict sense 
only the sea or a land district unarmed." ^^ On the murder of 
Phraates by his sons Mithridates assumed the offensive against 
Rome by declaring war on Armenia in a dispute over boundaries ; 
but civil strife arose in Parthia and Mithridates fled to Gabinius, 
as has been mentioned before. Crassus took up the interrupted 
plans of his predecessor, only to meet with disaster at Carrhae. 
The Parthians now had absolute control beyond the Euphrates, 
and Armenia became a Parthian dependency. The policy of 
aggression, which the Parthians consistently pursued until after 
the defeat of their leaders, Labienus and Pacorus, now brought 
them into alliance with the Jews and other peoples of Syria who 
were eager to be relieved of Roman domination. 

The importance of Parthian influence in Judaea must not be 
underestimated. It must be remembered that Parthia was a 
continuation of Persia and that of all foreign domination the 
Persian rule was the one which the Jews most highly respected.^^ 
While it can be assumed that there had long been a pro-Parthian 

2o/fet(i. VI, 1, 24; Appian, Mith. 105. 

2iVi(i. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV, p. 343, for the treaty between 
lyUCuUus and the Parthians. 

22Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 22. 
23Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 267. 



16 University of Missouri Studies 

party in Judaea fostered by the communication of the Jews in 
the two countries, it was not until after the defeat of Crassus 
that the first record of an actual alliance is found. The Roman 
disaster at Carrhae stimulated the anti-Roman Jews to action, 
and an alliance was formed with the Parthians in the hope that 
through them Roman influence could be destroyed and the old 
theocratic government restored. Pitholaus, who, since his de- 
sertion to Alexander at the time of the revolt against Gabinius,^* 
had established himself as the leader of the Nationalists, joined 
the Parthians in their attack on the remnant of the army of 
Crassus, which had been reorganized under Cassius Longinus. 
The time seemed opportune, for large bodies of Parthians had 
crossed the Euphrates and were ravaging Syria. The Roman 
troops were inadequate, and there was little confidence to be 
placed in a levy to be raised in the provinces, for auxiliaries from 
the allies, owing to the harshness and injustice of Roman rule, 
were either so disaffected toward Rome that it was impossible to 
trust them or were too weak to be of any considerable service.^^ 
Contrary to all expectations, Cassius drove the Parthians from 
the neighborhood of Antioch and, after defeating them in an 
ambuscade, killed their leader Osaces.^^ The army of Pitholaus 
was also defeated and he himself put to death, largely through the 
influence of Antipater, who feared his power among the anti- 
Roman Jews.^^ The Parthians withdrew into winter quarters 
in eastern Syria, where they remained during the winter months 
in the expectation of a renewed attack in the spring of 50 B. C. ; 
but, owing to civil dissension at home, the troops were recalled 
and the danger to Roman interests averted.^^ 

During the civil war in Rome, most of the great leaders in 
turn came to Syria, some to recruit money and supplies, others 
to put down disturbances. The politic Antipater, changing sides 

24Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 6, 1 ; Bell. Jud. I, 8, 6. 
25Cic. ad Fam. XV, 1. 

26Cic. ad Att. V, 20; 18; ad Fam. II, 10; XV, 14; Frontin. Strateg. 
II, 5,35; Dio, XL, 29. 

27Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 7, 1. 

28o(i Att. V, 21; VI, 1; Dio, XL, 30; Just. XL, 11, 4, 5. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 17 

as the fortunes of the leaders changed, made himself so useful to 
each in turn that his former alliances were overlooked. In re- 
turn for aid given when victory seemed hopeless at Alexandria,^^ 
Caesar restored to the Jews many of the privileges of which 
Pompey had deprived them. He confirmed Hyrcanus as heredi- 
tary High Priest^° and appointed him ethnarch of the Jews, thus 
restoring him to the poltical status taken away by Gabinius.^^ 
He made Antipater a Roman citizen and procurator of Judaea.^^ 

Now that Antipater was established as the representative of 
Rome in Judaea, he set about restoring order. He made his son 
Phaselus governor of Jerusalem and its surrounding territory 
and his younger son Herod governor of Galilee.^^ The energetic 
Herod soon quarreled with the anti-Roman Sanhedrin and was 
forced to flee for his life to Sextus Caesar,^* who championed 
his cause and made him general of the army of Coele-Syria. He 
was deterred from his intention of making war on the anti- 
Roman faction in Judaea^^ and was for some time engaged in 
helping Sextus with his work as governor of Syria. 

At this juncture (46 B. C.) the Pompeian party rallied 
about Caecilius Bassus and put Sextus Caesar to death. Bassus 
seems to have been seeking an independent principality for him- 
self in Syria.^^ Antipater sent aid under his two sons to Antis- 
tius Vetus, Caesar's representative,^'' while the Parthians, with 
whom Pompey himself had made negotiations and who had re- 

29joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 8, 1-2. 

30/fetU XIV, 8, 3-5. 

^'^Ibid. XIV, 117, gives the powers of an ethnarch. Cf. also Sands, 
Rom. Client Princes, Appendix. 

32It is impossible to determine exactly what Josephus means by pro- 
curator, for his use of technical terms is extremely vague. Cf. Momm- 
sen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 189, n. 

33Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9, 2 ; Bell. Jud., I, 10. 

34Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9, 1. 

ssjoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9, 5 ; Bell. Jud. 1, 10. 

36Dio, XLVII, 26-27; Liv. Epit. 114; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11, 1; 
Appian, B. C. Ill, 77, IV, 58. 

37joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11, 1 ; Bell. Jud. I, 10. 



18 University of Missouri Studies 

mained friendly to his cause,^^ sent aid to Bassus, then besieged 
in Apamea.^^ With their assistance Bassus continued to main- 
tain his position during the year 45. This aggression on the 
part of the Parthians probably caused Caesar to hasten his plans 
for a great campaign in the Orient.*" His assassination put an 
end to these plans. 

In October, 44 B. C.,*^ Cassius went into Syria to gain this 
province for the Liberators and to raise money for their cause.*^ 
He won over the forces besieging Bassus at Apamea*^ and later 
even the forces of Bassus himself.** In this way a division of 
Parthians came into the power of Cassius.*^ An opportunity 
seemed to offer itself to Cassius to carry out Pompey's plan of 
seeking aid from Parthia.*'' He dismissed the Parthians with 
gifts and sent with them an embassy to Orodes, the king, to ask 
for aid.*'^ The Parthians recognized the fact that it was to their 
advantage for Roman arms to be engaged in civil war rather than 
to be turned against them. Accordingly, they sent a body of Par- 
thian horse.*® 

After his victory at Apamea, Cassius set to work to obtain 
funds for the Liberators by levying exorbitant tribute. Anti- 
pater, consistent with his policy of proving himself valuable to 
each Roman leader in turn, immediately made efforts to collect 
the portion assigned to him. It was through such financial specu- 
lations as this that the pro-Roman Jews had grown apart from 
the reactionary element. The life of these capitalists involved a 
close association with the Roman officials. Marked discrepancies 

3SAppian, B. C. II, 83. 
39Cic. ad Ait. XIV, 9; Dio, XLVII, 27. 
40Appian, B. C. II, 110; Illyr. 13. 

*iVid. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. Ill, p. 107. 
42Dio, XLVII, 21; Veil. Pat. II, 62; Cic. Phil. XI, 27. 
43Dio, XLVII, 28; Appian, B. C. IV, 58. 

44Cic. ad Fam. XII, 11, 12; Joseph. Antiq. Jtid. XIV, 11, 12; Bell. 
Jud. I, 11, 1. 

45 Appian, B. C. IV, 59. 
^^Ibid. II, 83. 
^nbid. IV, 63. 
48Appian, B. C. IV, 88. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 19 

of social custom such as dietary regulations and differences in 
dress were untenable. The pro-Roman Jews were largely the 
moneyed class, composed not of the great landholders, but of 
men whose fortunes had been made by the Roman system of tax- 
ation: whose very existence depended upon the supremacy of 
Roman power.^^ Herod, working for his own interests as well 
as those of the Romans, then, was the first to hand in his quota, 
and as a reward Cassius appointed him general of Coele-Syria.^° 
On the other hand, when a city failed to raise its assessment, 
Cassius sold the inhabitants into slavery.^^ As a result, war 
broke out again in Judaea, for this outcome of affairs was a 
great blow to the Nationalists, who had held high hopes of the 
fall of the Idumeans on the death of Caesar, They had not 
realized that the Idumeans were supporting the Roman interests 
for selfish motives and that the wily Antipater would ingratiate 
himself into the favor of each faction in turn. When it was 
rumored that Herod was to be made king of the Jews, the Na- 
tionalists contrived to have Antipater poisoned. ^^ Cassius sup- 
ported Herod in his efforts to have the murder avenged, and 
Hyrcanus, although the murderer had been his friend, took no 
steps to protect him when he realized that he was being punished 
with the approval of Cassius. Thereafter Hyrcanus was under 
control of the pro-Roman Herod and Phaselus, his brother. 
Cassius soon went to join Brutus in their final stand at Philippi. 
The anti-Roman Jews found a leader in Antigonus, son of Aris- 
tobulus n, who endeavored to regain Judaea for his family.^^ 
His father-in-law, Ptolemy of Chalcis, who had regained much 
of the power taken away by Pompey, and Marion, tyrant of 
Tyre, came to his support. They seized three fortresses in Gali- 
lee.^* It was with affairs in this state of disorder that Antony 
took up his work of re-organization. 



^^Cf. Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., pp. 129-130. 

sojosephus. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11, 4. 

5iJoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11, 2; Appian, B. C. IV, 64. 

52/fciJ. XIV, 11, 3-4. 

53joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 11, 7; 12, 1; Head, Hist. Num. 682, 



CHAPTER III 



ANTONY S PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION 

Soon after the settlement at Philippi Antony set out for 
Greece.^ On his way he stopped at Thasos,^ where the Libera- 
tors had located a depot of supplies^ and whither many of the 
nobility had fled after the battle. An arrangement was made 
with them whereby they delivered to Antony the money, arms, 
and supplies stored there.* 

From Thasos Antony proceeded to Greece. Here he at- 
tended the various games and was initiated into the Eleusinian 
mysteries. Plutarch^ attributes his conduct in Greece to a mere 
love of pleasure and a passion for amusement. There seems to 
be a deeper reason. When Octavian went into the East (22 B. 
C.) he visited Athens, where he also was initiated into the 
Eleusinian mysteries, and Sparta, where he partook of the 
famous broth of the syssitia.® Yet sentimental enthusiasm of any 
kind could never be assigned to Octavian, and it would be an ex- 
aggeration to call him a Philhellene.^ Surely he, as Antony be- 
fore him, saw the value of such steps in influencing public opin- 
ion in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The Parthian kings fol- 
lowed the same policy. It was because of the influential Greek 

iPlut. Ant. 23. No other source mentions this stop in Greece, 
but, since his conduct there, as given by Plutarch, corresponds with his 
poUcy in general, there is no reason to doubt his stay there. Gardthau- 
sen, II, 84, n. 6, accepts the stop in Greece, and offers as the reason An- 
tony's well known love of Athens. 

2It is curious that with the exception of Drumann, Gesch. Roms I, 
p. 388, this seems nowhere mentioned in the secondary works. Appian, 
B. C. IV, 136, the only source, mentions it in connection with the battle 
of Philippi, not with Antony's expedition into Asia. 

3Appian, B. C. IV, 106. 

^Ibid. 136. 

spiut. Ant. 23. 

^Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 192. 

''Ibid; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, V, p. 7, 

(20) 



Antonyms Oriental Policy 21 

cities^ in their domain that they placed "Philhellene" as a title on 
their coins.^ Much of Antony's work lay in Asia Minor, where 
the Greek cities, with their abhorrence of everything that re- 
stricted the sovereign autonomy of each city-state, created a 
problem for any power aspiring to rule Asia." Antony, there- 
fore, entered into the various phases of Greek life, not merely 
to gratify his own pleasure, but rather to become recognized as 
an enthusiastic Philhellene". In this fact lies the importance 
of his stay in Greece. 

In the early spring^^ Antony left Lucius Censorinus to con- 
tinue the government of Greece^^ and sailed for Asia, in all prob- 
ability landing at Ephesus." Josephus^^ evidently supposes that 
Antony entered Asia by the northern land route, since he states 
that a commission of Jews met Antony in Bithynia before he 
came to Ephesus.^^ It seems more probable that the larger and 
more important delegation, composed of Herod and the promi- 
nent Jews of the Nationalist party which met him in Bithynia, 
would be preceded by the smaller delegation which brought him 
propitiatory gifts at Ephesus. Furthermore, in the decrees^^ 
which Antony issued at the request of the delegation which met 

sQreek towns in large numbers were scattered throughout the em- 
pire. RawUnson, Perth, p. 88. Appian, Syr. 57-58 names these cities. 
One of the most important was Seleucia. Plin. N. H. VI, 30; Tac. 
Ann. VI, 42 ; Appian, Syr. 57. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 10 discusses 
these cities. 

9Head, Hist. Num., pp. 692-3. 

lOBevan, House of Seleucus, I, p.. 88. 

iiPlut. Ant. 23. Bevan, House of Seleucus, I, pp. 100-126, discusses 
the problem of the Greek cities. 

i2Ganter, Prov. Verw., p. 33, p. 35. 

i^Macedonia, Greece, and Illyria seem to have been united into one 
province known frequently under the name of Macedonia. Ganter, 
Prov. Verw., p. 31, n. 3, by CIL,. I, p. 461, shows that he had charge of 
Greece and Macedonia, not Greece alone. Plut. Ant. 23. 

i^Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 139, assumes from Appian, B. C. V, 4 that 
he landed at Ephesus. 

"Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 2. 

leBouche-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 233, N. 3. 

"Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 3. 



22 University of Missouri Studies 

him at Ephesus he mentions a former embassy to Rome but does 
not mention a previous delegation to him. in Bithynia. There- 
fore it seems better to place the delegation to Bithynia after that 
to Ephesus and, as a consequence, to conclude that Antony en- 
tered Asia by the way of Ephesus rather than by the way of 
Bithynia. 

The fact that Antony would be compelled to transport his 
troops to Asia by the northern route because of lack of ships^* 
would not have prevented his own visit to Athens and Ephesus 
before rejoining his troops in the north. Furthermore, Ephesus 
was the seat of the Roman proconsul in Asia,^^ where were kept 
the public records^" and the treasury of the province.^^ There- 
fore, if Antony's visit to Athens is accepted, it is not illogical 
to conclude that he sailed from Athens to Ephesus as the most 
feasible place to begin his work of reconstruction in Asia.^^ 

Modern historians, placing full reliance on Plutarch's stories 
of Antony's excesses while in Asia, lay great emphasis on the 
extravagant reception accorded to him on his arrival at Ephesus 
and see in his succeeding actions nothing of the proceedings of a 
Roman magistrate, but only the erratic conduct of a man given 
over to gratifying his own lusts and desires.^^ It seems, how- 
ever, that by a careful culling from the stories of cooks, harpists, 
and courtesans those statements which, although given incident- 
ally, point toward his general policy of administration, the con- 
duct of Antony in the Orient can be shown to correspond in a 
remarkable degree to the customary procedure of a Roman pro- 
consul. 

i^Ganter, Prov. Verw., p. 33. 

i^Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 292. 

20CIL. Ill, 6075, 6081, 6082; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 138. 

21CIL. Ill, 6077; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 138. 

22Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 138, states that so strong a precedent arose 
for the governors to enter Asia at Ephesus that Caracalla issued a decree 
to that effect. For a discussion of Ephesus as the xoivov 'Aaiag vid. 
Chapot, Prov. Rom., pp. 454-467. 

23Bouche-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 232; Gardthausen, Aug. I, p. 183; 
Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, 227; Duruy, Hist. Rome, 
III, p. 615; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 55. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 23 

Plutarch^* says that women met him dressed as Bacchae, 
men as Fauns and Satyrs,^^ all addressing him as Dionysus in 
their songs. This enthusiastic reception as a means of winning 
the favor of the new governor was usual, especially in the East, 
where the people, accustomed to a servility which carried respect 
for a master almost to adoration, made the governor the object 
of the most flattering and impressive demonstrations.^*' To the 
Oriental mind the relation between governing and governed was 
that between master and slave." Cicero^^ boasts of the crowds 
that met him even at Samos.^^ There is extant an extravagant 
decree of the Ephesians in honor of Caesar.^^ Even Paul and 
Barnabas were addressed as Jupiter and Mercury on their en- 
trance to Lycaonia.^^ 

Antony, on his part, offered a splendid sacrifice to the city- 
goddess Artemis^- and doubled the area of sanctity for the tem- 
ple.23 Here again censure has come to Antony for such a "reck- 
less arrangement." ^^ Yet in earlier times Alexander had granted 
an extension of the right of asylum at Ephesus. Indeed, to ex- 
tend the privilege of Greek temples and to make contributions to 
their enlargement was the easiest way for a ruler to demonstrate 
his usefulness to the Greek cities.^^ The prestige and splendor 
of the city shrine brought worshippers and visitors who made 
the festivals popular, quickened trade, and brought money to the 



24Plut. Ant. 24. 

25Vid. Brown, The Great Dionysiac Myth, II, p. 66, for the place 
of Satyrs in the worship of Dionysus. 

26Person, Admin. Prov. Rom., p, 273. 

^'''Bevan, House of Selencus, I, p. 5. 

28Cic. ad Att. V, 13; 14; 20. 

29D'Hugues, Prov. Rom. pp. 216-218. 

^''Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 62. 

3iActs XIV, 11. 

32Appian, B. C. V, 4. 

33Strabo, XIV, 1, 23. 

34Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 232. 

ssBevan, House of Seleucus, I, p. 109. Caesar also gave Antony 
precedent, in that he larged the territory of the Comana and Zela priests. 
Tudeich. Caesar im Orient^ pp. 117. 156. 



24 University of Missouri Studies 

city. To gain the good will of the cities similar concessions had 
been given by the various competitors for power in Asia. These 
cities, aside from commercial reasons, considered it advantageous 
to have large sacred asylums in that this was a guarantee against 
devastation in time of war.^^ Furthermore the influence of the 
priests at the head of such largely endowed sanctuaries must not 
be underestimated. Since the Lycians were lacking in large city 
buildings they assembled in the temples to discuss public affairs, 
often with the priest presiding. Therefore the Greeks, although 
usually intolerant of priestly supremacy, found the cult of Ar- 
temis useful as a fusion of Oriental and Hellenistic ideas.^^ The 
immense sacerdotal interests which had developed here were too 
strong to be treated disrespectfully even by Octavian.^^ Accord- 
ingly, it seems that Antony had ample reason for his action in 
the influence he would thus gain at Ephesus. 

In criticizing Antony for increasing the area of sanctity it 
has been held that this right increased lawlessness by furnishing 
a place of refuge for criminals. It must be remembered that the 
Roman conception of the right of asylum differed from that of 
the Greeks in that it took little account of the religious sentiment 
when it came into contact with the proper punishment of evil- 
doers and criminals. The right of asylum was limited to tem- 
porary protection, until formal trial could be made and judg- 
ment based on evidence could be given. In this way it became an 
aid rather than a hindrance to criminal procedure.^^ 

That Antony held the Roman rather than the Oriental view 
of sanctuary is shown by the fact that, of those refugees who 
had fled to the temple after the defeat of Brutus and Cassius, he 
refused pardon to Petronius, who had taken part in the murder 
of Caesar, and to Quintus, who had betrayed Dolabella to Cas- 
sius at Laodicea.*° Loyalty to the government was a condition 

s^Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 40. 

^■'lUd., p. 398. 

38 Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 232. 

s^Trenholme, Right of Sanctuary in England, pp. 6-7. 

^oAppian, B. C. V, 41 ; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 407. 



Antonyms Oriental Policy 25 

essential to the recognition of the right of sanctuary.*^ This fact, 
rather than the influence of Cleopatra, explains the execution of 
Arsinoe when she was a suppliant at the temple of Artemis.*^ 

In a comparison of Antony's work in the Orient with that 
of a Roman proconsul, it is necessary to keep in mind the abso- 
lute power of a governor in his province. Under the republic 
there was placed at the head of each province a magistrate, 
sometimes a consul or praetor, more often a proconsul or a 
propraetor.^^ From the day when he received the office from the 
hands of his predecessor his authority was supreme. As far as 
the province was concerned, he was an absolute dictator who had 
every power over it and over whom it had no power. As far as 
Rome was concerned he was practically independent. No one 
could force him to resign or prescribe his line of conduct. In 
his province he was the equal of the consul at Rome. Like him 
he had his lictors and all the appurtenances of public authority. 
In reality he was more powerful than the consul, for he was not 
hampered by the senate, tribunes, and censors. An unscrupulous 
governor could unite in his own authority the powers of most of 
the magistrates of the capital.*^ 

The first duty of a governor was to issue an edict that 
should set forth the rules and regulations of law and equity that 
he intended to follow in the exercise of his jurisdiction.*^ The 
edict consisted of two parts. In the first division were the affairs 

4iChapot, Prov. Rom., p. 407. 

*2Appian, B. C. V, 9, states that she was killed at Miletus; Joseph. 
Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, at Ephesus. Dio XLVIII, 24, says dSeXqpoug. 
Gardthausen, Aug. II, p. 86, n 18, suggests that Dio was thinking of the 
false Ptolemy, who called himself a brother of Cleopatra and who was 
given into Antony's power. Chapot, referring to Mommsen's Strafrecht, 
p. 460, n. 1, says that the Romans may have considered the right of 
asylum a hindrance only to the local authorities. He explains Antony's 
action accordingly. 

*3Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 282, discusses the various appointments of 
these magistrates. 

**Person, Admin. Prov. Rom., p. 366. 

^^Ihid., pp. 270-3; Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin., p. 54; D'Hugues, 
Prov. Rom., p. 298. Cic. ad Att. VI, 1, gives a summary of his edict. 



16 University of Missouri Studies 

which were properly within the jurisdiction of the governor, 
such as the accounts of the cities, their debts, the rate of interest, 
and all matters pertaining to the collection of taxes. In the sec- 
ond division were matters which would be decided according to 
the edict and for which the edict had to provide, such as wills, 
acquisitions, and mortgages.^^ For matters not treated in the 
edict the governor formally referred to the edicts of his prede- 
cessors, which formed a legal code in themselves, the edictum 
tralaticium}'^ While there is no mention of Antony's issuing an 
edict as such, he did summon to an assembly at Ephesus the 
peoples of the surrounding territory, as was customary, and de- 
livered to them an address corresponding in part to the first divi- 
sion of a governor's edict in that it was a statement of his policy, 
of the levies expected from these peoples, and the time of pay- 
ment.*^ It is probable that such matters as were usually taken 
up in the second part of the edict were included in a formal pub- 
lication, but Appian would scarcely incorporate such material 
into a speech even if he had the source material for so doing. 

As soon as possible after issuing his edict the governor be- 
gan a tour of his province,^^ holding court at the towns set apart 
as convenient centers in which he was accustomed to stop and 
hold court.^° For convenience the provinces were divided into 
conventus iuridici.^'^ Pliny^^ enumerates the conventus of the 
provinces after the reorganization by Agrippa, naming the im- 
portant cities of each.^^ In planning his route the governor in- 

*^Person, Admin. Prov. Rom., pp. 270-3. 

*7Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin, p. 55; Cic. ad Att. V, 21; ad Fam. 
Ill, 8, 4. 

48Appian, B. C. V, 4-5. 

*9Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin., p. 59; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 352; 
Person, Admin. Prov. Rom., p. 278. 

soCic. in Verr. V, 11. 

siStrabo, XIII, 4, 12; Cic. ad Fam. XIII, 67, where he uses the 
Greek term ; ad Fam. Ill, 8, where he uses the latinized dioecesis. 

^^N. H. V, 25 sq. He mentions Laodicaea, Synnada, Apamea, Ala- 
banda, Sardis, Smyrna, Ephesus, Adramyttium, and Pergamum. 

s^Vid. Chapot, Prov. Rom., pp. 351-358, for a discussion of the con- 
ventus iuridici. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 27 

eluded as far as was possible these cities, but it was by no means 
necessary to visit each one. Cicero^* carried on the greater part 
of his judicial work in Laodicea, where cases were tried from 
the districts of Cibyra, Apamea, Synnada, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, 
and Isauria. 

Antony set out on such a tour as soon as his work at Ephe- 
sus was completed.^^ In a discussion of this tour it must be re- 
membered that Antony's work did not lie in one province alone, 
but included the administration of all territory in the Orient 
dominated by Rome. Appian^^ gives the only definite statement 
of the districts included in Antony's tour. He states that Phry- 
gia, Mysia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, Coele- Syria, Palestine, Iturea, 
and the other provinces of Syria were included. Josephus in- 
cludes Bithynia." A conjectural route would pass through Ephe- 
sus, Smyrna, Sardis, Magnesia, Pergamon, Adramyttium, Cy- 
zicus, Nicaea, Ancyra, Pessinum, Synnada, Icanium, Cy- 
bistra, Tyana, Tarsus, Antioch, Laodicea, Apamea, Epiphania, 
from which a cavalry expedition was sent to Palmyra, Damas- 
cus, through Iturea, across Palestine to the coast and thence to 
Egypt. 

On this tour it was the duty of the governor to attend to 
the repair and maintenance of all public buildings, roads and for- 
tifications.^^ Accordingly, while in Greece, Antony made rich 
gifts to Athens, ordered that repairs be made on the senate-house 
at Megara and that the temple of Pythian Apollo be surveyed 
preparatory to certain additions.^^ While on his tour of the 
East he gave relief to the cities that had suffered devastation 

^^ad Att. V, 21. Cicero's province consisted of Cilicia, Aspera and 
Campestris, Pisidia, Isauria, and Lycaonia. To these had been tem- 
porarily added three "Dioeceses" in Phrygia, Laodicea, Apamea, and 
Synnada, and the Island of Cyprus. Vid. Shuckburg, Introduction to 
Letters of Cicero, Vol. II, p. IX. 

ssAppian, B. C. V, 7. 

^-^Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 2. 

^sPerson, Admin. Prov. Rom. p. 279. 

sspiut. Ant. 23. 



1 



28 University of Missouri Studies 

during the civil wars,®" established a gymnasium at Tarsus,®^ and 
ordered the rebuilding of Xanthus.®^ 

In his military capacity the governor directed that levies 
be made®^ and could in case of need call out any veterans that 
might be living in the province.®* Antony incorporated the gar- 
risons of the country around Apamea into his own forces and 
assigned them to garrison duty in Syria because they knew the 
country.®^ For naval purposes he ordered two hundred ships 
to be built and manned.®® 

It was, however, in the capacity of supreme judge that the 
proconsul impressed himself most strongly upon the minds of 
the provincials.®'^ Although the inclination of the governor 
largely decided the extent of his authority,®^ in the performance 
of his judicial function the governor was endowed with absolute 
power, for, in theory, the province was perpetually under mar- 
tial law.®" 

There are but few references in the sources to actual judi- 
cial work on Antony's part with the exception of dynastic dis- 
putes. Plutarch states first that Antony's judicial decisions at 
Athens were just and equitable;^" second, that when Cleopatra 
arrived at Tarsus Antony was seated in the tribunal with the 
people assembled before him in the agora ;'^^ and third, that fre- 
quently when he was administering justice to tetrarchs and kings 
on his tribunal, he would receive from Cleopatra love letters 
written on onyx or crystal and read them.'^^ It is therefore to be 
assumed that he held court in the important towns on his tour. 

eoAppian, B. C. V, 7. 

eiStrabo, XIV, 5, 14. 

62Appian, B. C. V, 7. 

^^Bell. Alex. 50. 

6*Cic. ad Att. V, 18. 

65Dio, XLVIII, 25. 

66Appian, B. C. V, 55 ; Plut. Ant. 30. 

•^^Arnold, Rom. Prov. Admin., p. 59. 

^Hhid., p. 61. 

69/fcid., p. 62. 

■'^Ant. 23. 

7i/fet(f. 26. 

■'Hhid. 58. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 29 

In case of quarrels between cities, tributes, or contestants to 
a throne the governor was frequently called in as arbitrator/^ 
When he felt that he was not in a position to settle such questions 
he referred the case to Rome for instructions.'^* Cicero was 
called upon to settle a dispute between Ariarathes and his brother 
Ariobarzanes/^ Antony likewise judged between rival claim- 
ants to thrones.''^ Among such cases was the dispute between 
Ariarathes and Archelaus (Sisena)/^ 

Appian attributes Antony's award of the kingdom to Arche- 
laus in preference to Ariarathes to the influence of his beautiful 
mother, Glaphyra/^ Consequently modern historians cite this as 
an instance of Antony's favoritism and caprice.'^® When the re- 
lationship between Archelaus and Herod is recalled, a different 
light in thrown on the situation. Archelaus was exceedingly 
friendly with Herod.®° His daughter, Glaphyra, married Her- 
od's son, Alexander. Ariarathes had had constant trouble in 
maintaining his position in Cappadocia. Although a portion of 

■^sPerson, Admin. Prov. Rom., p. 278. 

^^Ibid., p. 279. 

75Cic. ad Fam. XV, 2; ad Att. 20; ad Fam. XV, 4. 

76 Appian, B. C. Y, 7; Plut. Ant. 24. 

'^'' Appian, B. C. V, 7, places this decision in the year 41 ; Dio, XLIX, 
32, in the year 36 ; Val. Max. IX, 15, 2, gives no date ; Tac. Ann. II, 42, 
in 34. Since Tacitus states that the decision took place 50 years before 
16 A. D., Gardthausen, Aug. II, p. 185, n. 12, says that Tacitus was using 
round numbers and did not contradict Dio. He says that Ariarathes 
ruled from 42 to 36 and struck coins as king during that period. (Head, 
Hist. Num., p. 633). Niese (article in Pauly-Wissowa under Ariarathes) 
states a preference for 41 without entering into the discussion. It seems 
probable that Antony made the decision in favor of Archelaus in 41 but 
did not enforce it until 36 when he was again taking up such matters. 
Hence I put the decision in 41. This explanation would eliminate the 
seeming contradiction in Appian and Dio. 

785. C. V, 7. It is amusing to note that Plutarch, Ant. 58, insists 
that Antony was so infatuated with Cleopatra at this time that he would 
interrupt the procedure of such cases to read her love letters. 

^sperrero. Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 390; Bouche- 
Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 233; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 292; Drumann, 
Gesch. Roms I, p. 390. Martial, XI, 20, lends weight to this opinion. 

sojoseph. Antiq. Jud. XVI, 8, 6. 



30 University of Missouri Studies 

lesser Armenia had been assigned to him by Caesar in 47 B. C.,^^ 
not a foot of his possessions remained in his power by 45 B. C, 
when he came to Rome to attempt to buy a kingdom of Caesar.^* 
In the time of Cicero's proconsulship he had been party to a con- 
spiracy to win the power from his brother Ariobarzanes, who 
was under the special protection of Rome.^^ On the other hand 
Archelaus had proved himself a most efficient ruler. Later Oc- 
tavian also, recognizing his ability, not only confirmed him in his 
power but also gave him Cilicia with the difficult task of over- 
coming piracy. He ruled from 36 B. C. to 17 A. D.®* Since 
Cappadocia was a region that it was essential for the Romans to 
hold in case of a Parthian invasion,^^ in the choice between these 
men Antony seems to have been influenced by the ability of the 
man to render him effective assistance rather than by the wiles 
of the charming Glaphyra. This is the first instance of Antony's 
use of a policy that he maintained throughout his entire adminis- 
tration of the Orient, the appointment of pro-Roman native 
princes to the thrones of border kingdoms to protect the Roman 
interests. Their territory became buffer-states against the power 
of Parthia. Caesar had adopted the same policy after the battle 
of Zela.^*' Octavian continued the policy. He surrounded the 
Euphrates frontier with a series of states which acknowledged 
Roman influence as supreme by accepting princes of his appoint- 
ment.^^ 

Antony also showed excellent judgment in his dealings with 
the Jews. It has already been suggested that while he was in 
Ephesus ambassadors had come to him from Hyrcanus bringing 
a golden crown and requesting that he command that those Jews 
be set free who had been carried away into captivity by Cassius, 
and that the country that Cassius had taken away from the Jews 

815^//. Alex. XVI, 6. 

82Cic. ad An. XIII, 2. 

83Cic. ad Pam. XV, 2. 

84Head, Hist. Num., p. 633. 

85Cic. ad Pam. XV, 2. 

^^Bell. Alex. 78; Judeich, Caesar im Orient, pp. 149-159. 

87 Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 213. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 31 

be restored. The request was granted, and decrees were sent to 
Tyrians, Sidonians, Antiochians, and Aradians, commanding any 
property taken from the Jews in the time of Cassius to be re- 
stored and all Jews sold by him as slaves to be f reed.^^ 

A second deputation came to Antony in Bithynia. This 
delegation represented the Nationalist party, who again had hopes 
of the downfall of the Idumeans, since they had but lately given 
their full support to the Liberators. They had complained to 
Antony that although Hyrcanus had the nominal authority, in 
reality Herod and Phaselus held the power. Herod, who ap- 
peared in his own defense, had not been trained in the Roman 
inethods in vain. Josephus^^ states that because of bribes^" An- 
tony paid great respect to Herod and that his adversaries ob- 
tained no hearing. It is probable that Antony well remembered 
the pro-Parthian proclivities of Herod's opponents of the Has- 
monean house and the loyal support which the Idumeans had 
always given Roman interests whether of one political faction 
or of another; consequently he felt fully justified in refusing to 
hear the Nationalists. This was not an unusual procedure on the 
part of the governor. Cicero^^ takes great credit to himself be- 
cause he had not been so difficult of access to ambassadors as 
former governors, but he says that even he sometimes refused to 
grant a hearing.^^ 

When Antony came to Antioch,^^ a delegation of one hun- 
dred prominent Jews met him to accuse Herod and the Idumeans 
of misgovernment. A certain Messala^* spoke in refutation of 

ssjoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 12, 8-6, where the decrees and the letter 
to Hyrcanus are given in full. 

89/fetU XIV, 12, 2. 

90Bribery was very prevalent. Cicero, ad Att. V, 20, states with 
great pride that he did not accept the bribes of those coming for judg- 
ments. 

9iad Att. VI, 2. 

^^ad Att. V, 20. 

93It is interesting to note that neither Caesar nor Antony carried on 
negotiations with the Jews in Judaea. 

o^Probably Marcus Valerius Messala, distinguished in both politics 
and letters. At this time he was a partisan of Antony. Vid. Smith, 
Diet, of Gk. and Rom. Biog., p. 1051. 



32 University of Missouri Studies 

the charges. The hearing was held at Daphne^^ in the presence 
of Hyrcanus. By an appeal to Hyrcanus to state which party 
ruled most beneficially for the people, Antony compelled him to 
ally himself openly with one party or the other. He took his 
stand with pro-Romans. As a result Antony appointed Herod 
and Phaselus tetrarchs.^® By this appointment they became in- 
dependent allied princes with full political powers, but in rank 
inferior to a king. Hyrcanus retained, as under Pompey, the 
power of high priest alone. A subsequent embassy of a thou- 
sand Jews came to Antony at Tyre to try to persuade him to 
change his decision. Admittance to Antony was refused, and a 
riot ensued in which several Jews were killed and others arrested. 
The outraged people arose against Herod, and in retaliation An- 
tony put the prisoners to death. For the time being the Na- 
tionalist party was forced to submit to the rule of the Idumeans. 

This course seems rather arbitrary on Antony's part, but in 
passing judgment it is necessary to keep in mind the importance 
of the loyalty of Judaea to Roman interests. At the beginning 
of the present war Lord Cromer, late viceroy of Egypt, hastened 
to point out the fact that Palestine is likely to prove one of the 
most important buffer-states after the war, both because it bor- 
ders on the Suez canal, the present great trade route from the 
East, and because it also borders on Egypt, the great source of 
the grain supply. Practically the same conditions, with the order 
of importance reversed, were true in the time of Herod. Fur- 
thermore, defection in Judaea threatened the very existence of 
the Eastern Empire by opening the frontier to the Parthians.®^ 

Antony has also been criticized for his treatment of the 
Syrian princes. It has been shown that the reorganization of 

^^A pleasure ground about five miles from Antioch. Vid. Momm- 
sen, Rom. Prov. II, pp. 140-141. 

^^This title, which primarily denotes the collegiate tetrarchate such as 
was usual among the Galatians, was later more generally used for their 
rule, as a whole, and then for the rule of one man, but always of a ruler 
in rank inferior to a king. Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 192, n. 1; 
Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 1. 

^^Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 187. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 33 

Syria under Pompey had been more nominal than real and that 
during the civil wars the deposed princes had profited by the 
general disorganization. The Parthians, as usual, had been of 
great assistance to them.^® On Antony's advance into Syria he 
overthrew the rule of these princes and attempted to re-establish 
the power of Rome, as Pompey had done. By this step he has- 
tened the inevitable conflict with Parthia, as these client princes 
of Parthia, for such they really were, fled thither for protection.^" 

It seems that, in Antony's dealings with the political ques- 
tions arising in the Orient, he followed the precedent set by 
Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar in placing in power those claimants 
to the throne who could most ably maintain and protect the in- 
terests of Rome. In his course of action he followed the regular 
proceedings of a Roman proconsul. He landed at Ephesus; he 
received the usual flattering demonstration of the people on his 
arrival ; he issued a form of edict ; he made a tour of the pro- 
vinces, stopping at the most important cities to hold court; he 
repaired and constructed public buildings ; he provided for naval 
and land forces; and he decided dynastic disputes. 

Regarding those matters which were outside the province 
of a Roman proconsul, such as the granting of freedom to cities, 
it will be necessary to compare his course of action with that of 
Caesar and Octavian. After the Mithridatic war Sulla inau- 
gurated a system of rewarding cities which had shown their 
loyalty to the Roman government by granting them libertas}^^ 
Although the practice was gradually discontinued until it was 
practically abolished under the early emperors,^°^ freedom was 
granted to certain cities by Caesar and Octavian as well as by 
Antony. Caesar gave freedom to Amisus,^^^ Apamea,^"^ Cni- 

98Appian, B. C. V, 10, 17. 

^^Ihid. V, 10. 

looChapot, Prov. Rom., p. 112. 

loi/fetU 103; Pauly-Wissowa {S. V. Asia), p. 1542; Henze, De Civ. 
Lib., p. 4. 

io2Strabo, XII, 3, 14; Dio, XLII, 48; Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 65; 
Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 117. 

lo^Judeich, Caesar im Orient, p. 111. 



34 University of Missouri Studies 

dus/°* Aphrodisias/°^ Ilium/°^ Antiochus Epidaphnis/°^ and 
confirmed the freedom of Rhodes."^ 

Antony freed Laodicea/°^ Tarsus/^" and Heraclea/^^ and 
confirmed the freedom of Seleucia in CiHcia/^^ and of Tyre/^^ 
Sidon,"* and Aphrodisias,"^ while he deprived of freedom 
Amisus^^^ and Antioch of Pisidia.^^^ 

Octavian, following the same policy, granted freedom to 
Samos,"^ Mytilene/^^ and Ilium. He confirmed the freedom of 
Stratonicea.^^" He deprived of freedom, usually because of lack 
of loyalty to Roman interests, Chersonesus Heraclea,^^'' C) zicus^-^ 
for a period of five years, Tyre/^^ and Sidon.^^* The freedom 
of Astypale was discontinued for a period.^^^ 

Antony, then, in granting freedom to some cities as a re- 

lo^Plut. Caes. 48; Chapot, Rom. Prov., p. 115; Henze, De Civ. Lib., 
p. 55. 

lospauly-Wissowa, S. V. Asia, p. 1542; Henze, De Civ. Lib., pp. 
52-54; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 114. 

loepauly-Wissowa, S. V. Asia, p. 1542; Strabo, XIII, 1, 27. 

lo'i'Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 75; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 117. 

losAppian, B. C. IV, 70; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 119. 

io9Appian, B. C. V, 7. 

"iHenze, De Civ. Lib., pp. 68-69. 

ii2Strabo, XIV, 5, 6; Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 72. 

ii^Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 1 ; Henze De Civ. Lib., p. 76. 

ii^Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 114. 

iieStrabo, XII, 3, 14; Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 65. 

"■^Dio, XLIV, 32; I.XIII, 26; Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 48, p. 78. 

iisPlin. A^. H. V, 135; Dio, LXIV, 9; Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 46; 
Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 212; Firth, Augustus, p. 229; Chapot, Prov. Rom., 
p. 120. 

ii^Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 118. 

i2opiin. N. H. V, 109; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 120. 

i2iHenze, De Civ. Lib., p. 69. 

i22Dio, LXIV, 7; Arnold, Rom. Imp., p. 212; Chapot, Prov. Rom., 
p. 115. 

i23Dio, LXIV, 7 ; Henze, De Civ. Lib., p. 76. 

124/tjU 

i25Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 114. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 35 

ward for loyalty to his cause was but pursuing a policy already 
established. Likewise he was in full accord with a tendency fol- 
lowed by his successors when for various political reasons he 
deprived other cities of their freedom. 

He has been severely censured by both ancient and mod- 
ern historians for the important part which the influence of his 
friends played in his administration.^^® Yet even a cursory read- 
ing of Cicero's letters shows the insurmountable difficulty which 
that conscientious statesman met with in attempting to maintain 
an impartial government. When a man became a provincial 
governor he paid off all his obligations to his friends.^^^ He re- 
ceived requests of all kinds varying from obtaining panthers 
for the shows^^^ to preventing the trial of a friend's friend's 
mother-in-law.^^^ Even the "noble Brutus" felt that a friend's 
interests were of more importance than the rights of the pro- 
vincials.^^** Therefore Antony was only following a precedent 
already set, when he appointed his favorites to office.^^^ To the 
great expense caused by the extravagance of Antony's staff^^^ a 
parallel can be found in that of the average Roman governor's 
attendants. Cicero^^^ tells of the amazement of the people at the 
admirable character of his staff, but even Cicero was forced to 
admit that not all of the members conformed to his request that 
they be of no expense to the provincials.^^* 

In thus outlining Antony's work in the Orient, the purpose 
has not been to defend his personal life but to point out that his 
general policy in the Orient corresponded in a large measure to 
that of the average Roman governor. His whole course of ac- 

i26piut. Ant. 24. 

^27For examples of the letters of recommendation received and writ- 
ten by Cicero vid. ad Fam. XIII, 53, 55; 56; 61; 62; 63; 64; 65; 57 
12; 13. 

i28ad pam. II, 11; ad Alt. V, 21. 

i29ac; Fam. XIII, 54. 

i30Cic. ad An. V, 21, VI, 1 ; 2; 3. 

i3iStrabo, XIV, 1, 41; 5, 14; Plut. Ant. 24. 

i32piut. Ant. 24. 
^^^^ad Att., V, 16; 17; 18; 20; 21; VI, 1. 

i34ad Att., V, 21. 



»* 



36 University of Missouri Studies 

tion points toward the foundation of a strong provincial govern- 
ment patterned upon the precedent of those who haa preceded 
him and continued by his astute successor, not to the estabhsh- 
ment of a great empire for himself, for Antony after all was but 



i a "first-rate second-rate" man. 



CHAPTER IV 

ANTONY IN EGYPT 

There now arises the question as to Antony's purpose in 
spending the winter in Alexandria rather than in the further 
administration of provincial affairs in Asia Minor and Syria. 
With his work there well under way, but by no means completed, 
he hastened to Egypt, leaving Syria especially in a state of unrest. 
The people were ready to respond to the first incentives to revolt 
lound in the Parthian incursions of the following spring. 

Antony lacked patience and the ability for careful and pains- 
taking work. Big enterprises appealed to him, but the tedious 
labor involved in the actual accomplishment of these undertak- 
ings was irksome. The first step in Caesar's plans, whether of 
Oriental conquest or for the security of the provinces, was, in 
all probability, the reorganization of Asia Minor and Syria so 
that he could rely upon that region as a secure base of supplie" in 
his rear. Antony had set to work to carry out this reorganiza- 
tion with his usual energy and despatch, but when his first en- 
thusiasm began to wane, when the assigning of kingdoms, the 
hearing of embassies, the levying of tribute, and the settling of 
disputes between the petty princes was over, he was ready to 
begin the second step rather than to complete what promised to 
be a tedious task, the establishment of these first larger and more 
interesting measures on a firm foundation. 

If Antony was to establish the supremacy of Rome in the 
Orient, a successful raid into Parthian territory was essential | 

to offset the prestige gained by the Parthians from the defeat of 
Crassus; but, as Caesar, his own general had said, "There can 
be no army without money." ^ 

Therefore, the second step in Antony's establishment of the | 

power of Rome was the financing of the expedition against 
Parthia. Antony had not found Asia the lucrative source of 

iDio, XLII, 49; Plut. Caes. 17. 

(37) 



38 University of Missouri Studies 

revenue that he had hoped. From the time of Pompey Asia had 
been drained of money by constant and exorbitant levies and ex- 
actions until the country had come to a state of financial exhaus- 
tion not at first appreciated by the triumvirs. 

Egypt, on the contrary, was still abounding in riches. It 
was the only important state of the Eastern Mediterranean 
which was even nominally independent. The Ptolemies pos- 
sessed great and unexhausted treasure. Antony must have had 
all this in mind when he sent for Cleopatra to meet him at Tar- 
sus. In the light of these conditions the meeting at Tarsus is 
shorn of all the romantic glamor that has been so emphasized 
through the ages and becomes a political move on the part ot 
both Antony and Cleopatra. The woman at the head of Egypt 
was the cleverest of a line of clever women. The Macedonian 
Cleopatra, as the Cleopatras and Arsinoes before her, had aims 
and ambitions of her own in the accomplishment of which she 
was ready to use the same unscrupulous means. The Macedonian 
blood and tradition showed clearly in the character of the Pto- 
lemaic queens. These women plotted and intrigued for power as 
did the queens of the old Macedonian line. Arsinoe II married 
first the king of Thrace. On his murder by her half-brother 
Ceraunos, she married Ceraunos, while for a third husband she 
won her own brother after disposing of her step-daughter (per- 
haps her own daughter) to whom he was already married.^ The 
stories of the marriages of Cleopatra II and III are even more 

^Mahaflfy, Hist. Egypt, p. 77, states that in the royal family of Egypt 
the marriage of full brother and sister was considered highly desirable 
and quotes Maspero, Annuaire de I'ecole des hautes etudes, for 1916, 
p. 19 : "The nobility of each member of a Pharaonic house and his claims 
upon the crown corresponded to the amount of divine blood which he 
could show ; he that derived it from both father and mother had a higher 
claim than he who had it from one parent only. Here the Egyptian 
social laws permitted what would be impossible in any modern civiliza- 
tion. The marriage of a brother and a sister was the marriage par ex- 
cellence, and it contracted an unspeakable sanctity when this brother and 
sister were born of parents who stood in the same relation." Ptolemy IT 
was the first Macedonian to make this concession to the Egyptian tradi- 
tion, a concession which was adopted by his successors. 



Antonyms Oriental Policy 39 

harrowing, if we can accept the testimony of Justin.^ Can it be 
wondered that Cleopatra adopted as a means to establish her 
power first an intrigue with Caesar and then a marriage with 
Antony?* "The last Cleopatra is the best known of her line, 
but she is only a type of her class. There was no relegation of 
queens to the obscurity of the harem. They mingled in the 
political game as freely as men. It was indeed in the political 
sphere rather than in that of sensual indulgence that their pas- 
sion lay and their crimes found a motive." ^ Cleopatra was de- 
termined that Egypt should not meet the fate which had overtak- 
en the other kingdoms of the East, incorporation in the Roman 
Empire. The splendor and magnificence displayed on her jour- 
ney to Cilicia were not the mere gratification of vanity, a woman's 
foolish whim. Every detail was planned to impress the observer 
with the evidence of unlimited wealth. Antony needed money. 
Cleopatra needed Antony. 

Cleopatra was too perfect a mistress of the art of intrigue 
not to know that undue haste in unfolding her design of a great 
empire in Egypt would be fatal to her success. She had many 
enemies among the upper class who were bitterly opposed to her 
rule.® It must be remembered that the Ptolemies were not na- 
tive Egyptians but Macedonians, who, like the other kings of the 
Hellenic East, were bidding for Roman favor and dreading 
Roman wrath. There were never any national uprisings in favor 
of these sovereigns, for they made but little effort to inspire loy- 
alty in their native subjects.^ It may have been with a pretext 
of establishing her power against them that she asked Antony to 
come to Egypt, where, on his part, he hoped to obtain the funds 
necessary for his further work. Consequently, in the autumn 



^Vid. Mahaffy, Hist. Bgypt, for a discussion of this point. 

^Polygamy was common among all the successors of Alexander as 
well as in the earlier Macedonian court. Cf. Mahaflfy, Gk. Life and 
Thought, p. 23 ; Hist. Bgypt, p. 76. 

^Bevan, House of Seleucus, II, p. 280. 

^D'O, LI, 5; Bouche-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 181. Here, as else- 
where, Ferrero follows Bouche-Leclerq. 

^Cf. Mahaffy, Bmp. Ptol., p. 241. 



40 University of Missouri Studies 

of 41 B. C. Antony left Syria to spend the winter months in 
Alexandria. 

Much emphasis has been laid by the ancient historians on 
the fact that, on Antony's entrance into Alexandria, he laid aside 
the insignia of his office. They assume that he intended this 
act to be emblematic of his putting aside the cares and duties 
of a general and that he regarded his wintering in Egypt as a 
festal occasion.^ One needs only to look back at the entrance of 
Caesar into Alexandria^ to realize the wisdom of Antony's step. 
Caesar entered Egypt in full regalia of office. It seems strange, 
perhaps, that the populace of Alexandria, so accustomed to the 
pomp and ceremony of the royal court, should take offence at 
this. The large Roman element in the mob at Alexandria and 
the effect of such a procedure on them must be taken into ac- 
count. 

Caesar himself describes the composition of the forces which 
so nearly defeated him at Alexandria, "There were soldiers of 
Gabinius who had accustomed themselves to Alexandrian life 
and license, had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman 
people, and had married Egyptian wives by whom very many 
of them had had children. To these were added men collected 
from the freebooters and brigands of Syria, of Cilicia, and of 
the neighboring regions. Many condemned criminals and exiles 
had joined them. All our own fugitive slaves had a sure place 
of refuge at Alexandria. Assurance of their lives was given 
them on their being enrolled in the army. If any one of them 
was arrested by his owner he would be rescued by the common 
consent of the soldiery, who repelled violence done to their com- 
rades as a peril to themselves, since they were all alike involved 
in similar guilt." ^° ("Haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus, 
qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant 

^Appian, B. C. V, 11. Appian says it might also have been because 
he was in foreign jurisdiction. This is a more probable reason. 

9Dio, XLII, 7; Lucan, Phar. IX, 1007; Liv. Bpit, CXLI ; Frontin, 
Strateg. I, 1, 5; Caes. B. C. Ill, 106; Appian, B. C. II, 89; for a discus- 
sion of Caesar's landing Vid. Judeich, Caesar im Orient, pp. 78sq. 

loCaes. B. C. Ill, 110. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 41 

et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque 
duxerant ex quibus plerique liberos habebant. Hue aecedebant 
eolleeti ex praedonibus latronibusque Sryiae Ciliciaeque provin- 
ciae finitimarumque regionum; multi praeterea capitis damnati 
exulesque convenerant. Fugitivis omnibus nostris certus erant 
Alexandriae receptus certaque vitae condicio, ut date nomine 
militum essent numero ; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, 
consensu militum eripiebatur qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa 
versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant.") These Romans 
fully understood the significance of the fasces. The appearance of 
a Roman general in full insignia of office meant the probable loss 
of their much cherished freedom.^^ The Alexandrian mob was 
a power that had to be reckoned with. "The people of Alexan- 
dria spoke the voice of Egypt more completely than Paris does 
of France." ^^ These mercenary troops had lived in close rela- 
tion to the court and had assumed or drifted into the preroga- 
tives and dignities of the old Macedonian household troops.^' 
According to Caesar^* they had been in the habit of demanding 
the execution of friends of the royal family, of plundering the 
property of the wealthy, of besieging the kings' palaces to secure 
more pay, of driving one man from the throne and sum'moning 
another to fill it^ after the ancient custom of the Alexandrian 
army. 

It must be remembered, too, that Alexandria was no more 
a typical Greek city than an Oriental one. It lacked those all es 
sential parts of a polis, the boule and the demos. In the great 
mass of papyri that have come down from Egypt there is no 
where any indication that a senate met or that the people as 
sembled.^^ In place of an assembly in Alexandria was the sol- 



iiCf. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. Vol. IV, p. 511; Mahaflfy, Hist. Egypt, 
p. 239 sq. 

i2Mahaffy, Bmp. Ptol, p. ZZ2>. 

i3Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt, p. 241. 

i^Caes. B. C. Ill, 110. 

i^Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 107. 



42 University of Missouri Studies 

diery backed by the great mob whose influence in disturbed 
times increased to despotism.^^ 

Antony profited by the knowledge gained both from his staj 
in Egypt with Gabinius and from the experience of Caesar. Dur- 
ing his entire stay in Alexandria, he made every effort to gain 
the favor of the populace. Often at night both he and Cleopatra 
would sally forth in servant's disguise and mingle among the 
crowd, where they were often recognized. The Alexandrians 
took delight in his extravagances and joined in his frolics, say- 
ing that they were thankful to Antony for playing his tragic roles 
for the Romans and keeping his comedy for them.^'^ 

While the lower stratum of the Alexandrian population con- 
sisted in a large part of natives,^^ Alexandria was primarily a 
Greek city, founded by Alexander for the Greeks.^^ The selec- 
tion of a site in a remote corner of the delta indicated clearly his 
intention of making this Hellenic city which was to dominate 
Egypt as free as possible from Egyptian influence.^" The Mace- 
donians formed an especially privileged group. Just what these 
privileges were is uncertain, but they probably lay chiefly in fis- 
cal exemptions.^^ The Ptolemies had fully carried out Aristo- 
tle's words to Alexander,^^ when he advised him to be a leader 
of the Hellenes and a master of the barbarians, to provide for 
the former as friends and to use the latter as plants and ani- 
mals.^^ 

Antony did not fail to recognize the importance of the 
Greeks. Again he appears as Philhellene. He spent much time 



i6Cf. Mommsen, Rom. Hist. IV, p. 188; Mahaffy, Bmp. Ptol. 78; 
Merivale, Rom. Hist. Vol. I, p. 350. 

"Plut. Ant. 29. 

isMommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 287; Mahaflfy, Hist. Egypt, p. 10. 

isjust. 11, 2. 

20Wiegall, Life and Times of Cleopatra, p. 19. 

2iRadin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 108 for a further discus- 
sion. 

22Murray, Ancient Gk. Lit., p. 374. 

23Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 262. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 43 

with the Greeks. He wore their square-cut garment and the 
white Attic shoe of the Athenian and Alexandrian priests.^* 

Mahaffy has shown from a study of the papyri of the middle 
of the third century B. C. that Jewish settlements had existed for 
many years in Egypt.^^ There can be little doubt that Jews were 
found in all classes from the highly privileged Macedonians to 
the lowest slaves.^^ Here as in Judaea it was the tendency of 
the wealthy class to become completely Hellenized.^^ Antony's 
friendship with this element in Judaea must have been recognized 
by the Egyptian Jews. In the popularity won by Antony during 
his stay in Alexandria under Gabinius, coupled with his renewal 
of friendly relations with as many classes of the population as 
was possible, can probably be found the reason why he found 
less opposition among the Alexandrians than did other Romai- 
leaders. 

The ancient historians lay great emphasis on the revelries 
which took place in Alexandria during the winter of 41-40 B. C.^® 
Plutarch^^ describes a band which they called the "Inimitable 
Livers," the members of which vied with one another in daily 
entertainments of an extravagance beyond belief. Most modern 
historians take the same view.^° 

The prejudice of the sources must be taken into considera- 
tion.^^ It must be remembered that the original sources were 
written by men who were the supporters of Octavian. Every 

2*Appian, B. C. V, 11. 

^^Htst. Egypt, p. 193. Strabo XVII, 1, 12, when naming the citizens 
at Alexandria does not mention Jews. 

26In discussing the condition of the Jews in Alexandria Radin, Jews 
among the Gks. and Roms., p. 112, refers to Berliner Griechische Ur- 
kunden, IV, 1068, 1140, 1151. 

2'^Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 116. 

28Dio, XLVIII, 27; Appian, B. C. V, 11. 

29Plut. Ant. 28. 

soGardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 186; Bouche-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, 
239; Merivale, Hist. Rome, III, p. 176; Chapot, Prov. Rom., p. 56. 

3iFor a discussion of the sources vid. Biircklein, Quellen und 
Chronologie der romisch-parthische Feldsiige; Pauly-Wissowa, 5". V. 
Appian, and S. V. Dio Cassius. 



44 University of Missouri Studies 

calumny against Antony made any odium which might attach 
itself to Octavian through Antony's downfall less effective. 

Cleopatra would not have permitted Antony to be alto- 
gether forgetful of the business at hand. Plutarch tells an anec- 
dote of a little fishing expedition to illustrate Antony's love of 
pleasure and thereby misses the point of the story, Cleopatra's 
words to Antony : "Leave the fishing rod to us poor sovereigns 
of Pharos and Canopus. Your game is cities, provinces, and 
continents. "^^ Cleopatra had induced Antony to come to Alex- 
andria for a purpose. She hoped to maintain the power of Egypt 
by the means so often employed by the women of the Mace- 
donian line, an alliance by marriage. With the Roman legions at 
her command she hoped to extend Egypt to its old limits. 

The power of the women of the Ptolemies must not be un- 
derestimated. The men of the later Ptolemies, it is true, were 
largely degenerate, but one needs only to review the history of 
the Macedonian queens from Olympias to Cleopatra VIII to 
realize why the people of Alexandria so frequently permitted a 
queen to reign in the presence of legitimate male heirs.^^ They 
were women who knew how to use their great power and 
wealth.^* This made an alliance with them imply the command 
of large resources in men and money.^^ The Ptolemies, as the 
Pharaohs before them and the Roman emperors after them, 
regarded Egypt as little more than a crown estate to be man- 
aged with a view to the interests of the sovereign alone. ^® The 
revenue of the court at Alexandria was nearly equal to the pub- 
lic income of Rome even after its augmentation by Pompey.^^ 

^^Ant. 29: jroLQaSog tim-iv , E(jpT) , tov Jcd7.a(A0v , autoxQatOQ , xolg 
^apixaig xal KavcoPixaig ^aaiXev v- f) 8e ot) §riQa jtoAeig eIoi koX Paadeiai 
xal rjnEiQOi 

33Mahaffy, Emp. PtoL, p. 405, says that authorities do not explain this 
fact. For degeneracy of men vid. Strabo XVII, I, 11. 

34Mahaffy, Hist. Egypt, p. 212. 

350ne of the last kings of Egypt had an income of 12,500 talents. 
Strabo, XVII, 1, 12, who quotes some speech of Cicero probably not now 
extant. 

36Mahaffy, Hist. PtoL, p. 147. 

37Mommsen, Rom. Prov., II, p. 188. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 45 

Thus an alliance with Cleopatra would provide Antony with 
abundant funds for a victorious Parthian campaign, by which 
he hoped to win the prestige in Italy upon which his hopes for 
power there depended. The weak point in Cleopatra's plan lay 
in the fact that the triumvir^^ did not personify the state, as did 
a king who reigned by dynastic right. His power was temporary, 
and therefore an alliance by marriage was not an expedient 
which a representative of Roman authority might use.^^ Antony 
fully realized from Caesar's experience the impossibility of form- 
ing an actual marriage alliance with Cleopatra, if he wished to 
establish his power in Rome. Of what value would funds for 
his Parthian campaign be, if in gaining these funds he lost the 
end for which the Parthian campaign was but a means, namely 
final supremacy in Italy? Cleopatra likewise from her experi- 
ence realized the futility of anything but a legal marriage as a 
means of establishing her power. Hence the winter came to an 
end without an understanding having been reached, and Antony 
left Egypt without funds.*° 

Meanwhile grave disturbances had arisen in Italy where 
Fulvia, Antony's wife, and Lucius, his brother, with the alleged 
purpose of supporting Antony's interests, had provoked a would- 
be civil war ending with their defeat at the fall of Perugia.^^ 
During these disturbances no word had come from Antony ex- 
cept a letter, probably fictitious, which had been shown in the 
senate stating that "They [Fulvia and Lucius] should fight, if 
any one assailed his [Antony's] dignity." *^ Ancient as well as 
modern historians have been too ready to attribute this delay of 
Antony's at such a crisis, just as they do Caesar's stay when his 



38Technically the triumvirate was merely a board ret puhlicae con- 
stituendae. It had taken the place of a temporary dictatorship, for a 
board was always more according to Roman ideas than a dictatorship. 

39Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 243. 

^''After the treaty with Octavian at Brundusium Antony was rough- 
ly handled by the troops because he lacked the funds with which to pay 
them. 

«Appian, B. C. V, 12 sq ; Dio, XLVIII, 5, sq. 

42Appian, B. C. V, 29. 



46 University of Missouri Studies 

interests at Rome were in a perilous condition, to the charms of 
Cleopatra.*^ Although it must be admitted that Antony gave 
much of his time to gratifying his own pleasures, this cannot be 
given as the sole reason for his lack of communication with 
Italy.^* The siege of Perugia took place in mid-winter, when all 
navigation in the Mediterranean had ceased.*^ He could not 
have received this news until the spring of 40 B. C, after the 
fall of the fortress, too late to send aid. Deputies from the 
colonized veterans had come to him on the last transports to 
sail from Italy, it is true, but they would have arrived too late 
in the season for aid to have been sent to Lucius. Appian says 
that Antony retained the veterans and concealed his intentions.^^ 

Trouble threatened Antony from the East as well as from 
the West. The time seemed ripe for Parthia to extend her power 
westward. The enormous tribute levied by Antony had caused 
unrest and dissatisfaction.^'^ The tyrants who had been driven 
out of the cities in Syria had fled to the Parthians for support.*^ 
In addition to this the Parthians had the exceptional good for- 
tune to have at their service a Rornan versed in military affairs, 
Quintus Labienus. He had been sent to Orodes before the battle 
of Philippi to ask for help for the "Liberators." ^^ The king had 
detained him for some time in Parthia, for he hesitated to con- 
clude an alliance and feared to refuse. With the news of the 
defeat of his party and of the renewed proscriptions, Labienus 
decided to remain among the Parthians.^" 

An incitement to war was found in the attitude of the 
Aradii toward the messengers sent by Antony for tribute. One 

^^Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 213; Merivale, Hist. Rome, III, pp. 
181-2; Duruy, Hist. Rome, III, p. 623. 

44Plut. Ant. 28; Dio, XLVIII, 24; Appian, B. C. V, 11. 

*^For a discussion of the difficulty of travel during the winter vid. 
Duruy, Hist. Rome, IV, p. 228. The difficulties that St. Paul met with 
are well known. 

46Appian, B. C. V, 52. 

47Dio, XLVIII, 24. 

48Appian, B. C. V, 11. 

49Flor. IV, 9; Veil. Pat. II, 78. 

soDio, XLVIII, 24. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 47 

leader of this embassy, Curtius Salessas, was burned alive.^^ The 
Parthians thus finding the Syrians already indined toward ag- 
gression were the more readily persuaded by the arguments 
which Labienus set forth to the King On.des. He stated that 
the legions were at the point of revolt and advised an immediate 
expedition into Syria while Octavian was detained in Italy by 
Sextus Pompey and Antony given over to enjoyment in Egypt. 
He offered himself as leader and promised to detach the provinc- 
es from the Romans easily because of the hostility which their 
treatment had aroused. ^^ In the early spring Orodes sent his 
forces across the Euphrates under the joint leadership of his son 
Pacorus and Labienus. ^^ They rapidly overran the open country 
between the Euphrates and Antioch. 

News of the invasion of the Parthians came to Antony while 
he was in Alexandria.^* He wasted no time in delay but set sail 
for Tyre immediately.^^ The question now arises as to why 
Antony did not proceed to a vigorous campaign against the Par- 
thians. From statements of Dio Cassius^^ concerning Antony's 
troops one reason can be inferred. The larger part of Antony's 
legions were in Italy, Gaul, and Macedonia.^'' On the other hand 
the garrisons stationed in Asia by Antony were mainly troops of 
Cassius and Brutus which he had incorporated into his own 

siDio, XLVIII, 24; CIL, III, 546; vid. Gardthausen, Augustus, II, 
p. 84, n. 10. 

52Dio, XLVIII, 24. 

sspiut. Ant. 28 ; Appian, Syr. 51. 

s^Plut. Ant. 30, and Dio, XLVIII, 27, state that the news came 
simuhaneously with that of the fall of Perugia. Before accepting such 
a statement, Plutarch's love of dramatic effect must be taken into ac- 
count. Appian, B. C. V, 52, says that only the Parthian news reached 
him in Alexandria, while the news from Italy came later, probably in a 
seaport of the province of Asia. Appian's account seems more probable. 
The fall of Perugia and the outbreak of the Parthians took place about 
the same time, but the inclement condition of the Mediterranean did not 
hold back news from Asia. Cf. Kromayer, Hermes, XXIX, p. 562 ; Fer- 
rero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. Ill, p. 245, n. 

sspiut. Ant. 30; Dio, XLVIII, 27; Appian, B. C. V, 52. 

56XLVIII, 24-26. 

B^Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, p. 245, n. 2. 



48 University of Missouri Studies 

forces and assigned to garrison duty because they were familiar 
with the country. These men were easily won over to the cause 
of Labienus, since they knew him of old.^^ This left Antony 
without the troops necessary for a military expedition such as 
the campaign into Parthia now promised to be. Hence it can 
be assumed that he abandoned Syria for the time being, to return 
to Italy for his legions. ^^ Plutarch, however, states that he de- 
parted from Phoenicia because of letters received from Fulvia 
lamenting the condition of affairs in Italy.®" The latter reason 
seems the more probable, for, with such pressing need of action 
against the Parthians, it seems that Antony would have sent for 
these legions while he himself rallied what forces he had in 
Syria, had he not seen a greater need for his presence elsewhere. 
This need was the maintenance of his power in Italy. If Antony's 
great aim was to establish an empire for himself in the Orient, 
would he not have felt that the need of successful action against 
Labienus and Pacorus was too urgent for him to have gone in 
person for additional troops and to have stayed over two years 
before returning? It seems that his position in Italy was of 
paramount importance in his eyes and the campaign against the 
Parthians but a means to this end. This means, as was shown in 
his decision against a marriage with Cleopatra, was not to be 
adopted if the accomplishment of his great ambition, supremacy 
at Rome, would thereby be imperiled. 

Antony left Decidius Saxa in charge of Syria with orders 
to defend himself as best he could, while he himself sailed for 
Asia by way of Cyprus and Rhodes and then to Greece.®^ De- 
serted by large numbers of his troops, Saxa was defeated in 
open battle. The casualty list was large. As a result Saxa fled 
to Antioch, and Apamea, which had been holding out against 
the Parthians, yielded on the report that Saxa had been killed. 

s^Strabo, XIV, 2, 24, states that Labienus used cohorts of the Roman 
soldiery which had been stationed in Asia. 

s^Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. Ill, p. 245, holds 
this view, ahhough he maintains that Antony's Parthian campaign was 
the great a-m toward which all his other actions tend. 

^°Ant. 30. 

eiAppian, B. C. V, 52; Plut. Ant. 30; Dio, XLVIII, 27. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 49 

Saxa then abandoned Antioch and fled to Cilicia,^^ while Labienus 
and Pacorus, emboldened by their success, decided upon a divi- 
sion of their troops in order to engage simultaneously in two 
great campaigns Labienus in Asia Minor and Pacorus in Syria.®^ 

Labienus met with unbounded success. Saxa was soon de- 
feated and slain/* and Labienus seized Cilicia. Although most 
of the towns were easily taken, Stratonicea®^ and Mylasa stub- 
bornly resisted. When Mylasa was finally taken and razed to 
the ground, Labienus levied tribute, robbed temples to gain 
funds, and, in honor of his victories, styled himself Imperator 
Parthicus.^^ Pacorus likewise met with success. He conquered 
all Syria and Phoenicia with the exception of Tyre, which he was 
unable to capture for want of naval forces.'''^ Then he advanced 
into Palestine.^^ 

Relations between Antony and Octavian were becoming 
more and more strained, and civil war seemed imminent.''^ In 
Antony's conduct in this crisis his decision to maintain his power 
in the West against any encroachment on the part of Octavian 
seems clear. His energy and dispatch are hard to explain if the 
influence of Cleopatra and of the East were already at work. 
The determination of the legions to bring about a reconciliation,'^*' 
combined with the death of the turbulent Fulvia,^^ were the sav- 
ing factors which averted civil war for the time being. In Sep- 
tember, 40 B. C.,'^^ an agreement was reached, and a new par- 

62Dio, XLVIII, 24. 

6*Flor. IV, 9, says that he committed suicide. 

65Tac. Ann. Ill, 62. 

6^Not, as was the custom, the man who conquered the Parthians, but 
the man who, as a Parthian, conquered the Romans. Dio, XLVIII, 24; 
Appian, B. C. V, 65; Flor. IV, 9; Veil. Pat. II, 78; Just. XIII, 4; Uv. 
Bpit. CXXVI-VII ; Plut. Ant. 30. 

67Strabo, XIV, 2, 24. 

esjoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 3; Dio, XLVIII, 24. 

69Dio, XLVIII, 28; Veil. Pat. II, 26; Appian, B. C. V, 57. 

TOAppian, B. C. V, 57. 

7iDio, XLVIII, 28; Appian, B. C. V, 59; Plut. Ant. 30. 

72Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 563. 



50 University of Missouri Studies 

tition of the empire was made. The boundary line was through 
Scodra/^ a city of Illyrium supposedly midway up the Adriatic 
gulf. All provinces east of this place as far as the Euphrates 
were granted to Antony, all west of it to the Ocean to Octavian. 
Lepidus was to retain Africa.'^* There was no discussion of the 
accusations which had been made on both sides.^^ Even the sol- 
diery seemed to feel that the reconciliation was not firmly estab- 
lished and consequently demanded the marriage of Antony to 
Octavia, Octavian's sister, as a pledge of peace.''^ Antony de- 
termined not to make the mistake of risking his power in the 
West a second time by returning too hastily to the East. He set 
out for Rome with Octavian, where in October'^'' the marriage 
of Antony and Octavia was celebrated.'^^ 

73Plin. N. H. Ill, 26. A town with rights of Roman Citizens sit- 
uated at a distance of eight miles from the sea. 

74Appian, B. C. V, 65; Veil. Pat. II, 76; Ferrero, III, p. 225, sees in 
this arrangement the first consequence of Cleopatra's influence, since at 
the division after Philipp', Antony had claimed provinces in the West for 
himself. He probably realized now that he needed all his troops in the 
East and consequently left the task of the defence and administration 
of these provinces to Octavian. 

"Appian, B. C. V, 64. 

76Plut. Ant. 2,7; Appian, B. C. V, 64; Dio, XLVIII, 30 . 

''''Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 562. 

78Appian, B. C. V, 65; Veil. Pat. II, 78; Tac. Ann. I, 10; Plut. Ant. 
31 ; Liv. Bpit. CXXVII. 



CHAPTER V 

PREPARATION FOR THE PARTHIAN EXPEDITION 

As soon as the treaty with Octavian was completed, Antony 
turned his attention to checking the further advance of the Par- 
thians. He sent Ventidius into Asia to command the campaign 
against them.^ Ahenobarbus had already been appointed gov- 
ernor of Bithynia.^ He made Lucius Munatius Plancus govern- 
or of Asia and gave him all the legions then available at Brun- 
dusium and in Macedonia.^ He ordered Asinius Pollio to mobil- 
ize the legions in Europe for immediate transportation to the 
East from Macedonia, of which Asinius was to be governor in 
39 B. C* 

During the spring and summer of 39 B. C. Antony remained 
at Rome busy with Octavian in conciliating as best they could the 
hostility toward them. More and more Antony became con- 
vinced that to regain popularity and to put his power on a stable 
foundation some brilliant and lucrative enterprise was necessary. 
For this purpose a successful raid against the Parthians seemed 
best suited. To regain and to re-establish the prestige of Rome 
in the East would put provincial administration on a firm basis 
conducive to financial prosperity. 

The need was urgent, for Pacorus had supplemented the 
successes of Labienus by gaining control of all Syria except 
Tyre and had advanced into Palestine, where he had made an 
alliance with the anti-Roman Jews, who had again revolted. 
Antigonus had offered Pacorus a thousand talents for assistance 
in establishing him on the throne as a client prince of Parthia. 
It must be remembered that not all Jews lived in the Roman em- 
pire. Jews high in rank and culture had dwelt in what was now 
the Parthian kingdom since the time of Nebuchadnezzar. These 

lAppian, B. C. V, 65; Plut. Ant. 33; Dio, XLVIII, 39. 

2Appian, B. C. V, 63. 

3Cf. Ganter, Prov. Verw., pp. 37-41. 

Hhid. 71. 

(51) 



52 University of Missouri Studies 

Jews were not held as apostates, as were those of the West, but 
were a great source of orthodoxy upon which the Jews of other 
countries could draw. Furthermore they were in constant com- 
munication with Judaea. Radin^ says that with Parthia the 
only power still existing that was formidable to Rome, the un- 
interrupted communication between the Jews of that section and 
the mother country must have created a political situation of no 
slight delicacy and may have played a much more important part 
in determining the relations of the governing Romans to the Jews 
than our sources show. 

For many years there had been a pro-Parthian party in 
Judaea, but it must be remembered that this nationalist party fos- 
tered hatred against Rome not for political reasons alone. Ar- 
rayed with it were the Pharisees,® who seem to have hoped to 
find a greater sympathy and understanding for their religious 
philosophy from the Parthians than from the Romans. To the 
Roman the careful performance of the ancient rites of his own 
cults was largely an impersonal duty toward the well-being of 
the state, while the Pharisee made the Torah''^ a complete guide to 
his life not merely in theory but in actual practice. His aim wa.« 
to learn from what God had revealed His will in regard to 
every slightest action that a man might do. He felt that he must 
give his whole concern to the religious life, to meditation, prayer, 
and the accomplishment of his duty toward God and man. The 
Roman could sympathize with the ceremonial display and parade 
of many Oriental cults, but he could not understand the cold 
reserve and aloofness of the Pharisee. Then too from an ad- 
ministrative viewpoint the Roman was opposed to the Pharisee. 
The Pharisee believed that it was necessary to separate himself 
as far as possible from the peoples of the land with the purpose 

^Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 370. 

^Vid. supra, p. 3. 

'^The Torah was not merely the written word of the Pentateuch; 
consequently the term "Law" is not a good translation. Torah includes 
all the divine thought back of the "Law" and might be defined as the 
written word and the unwritten tradition taken together. Cf. Travers 
Hereford, Pharisaeism, pp. 57-1 IL 



Antony's Oriental Policy 53 

of setting up a closed corporation distinct from the surrounding 
peoples and of providing for the maintenance of the Jewish 
cultus. Here he was to live his whole life with the Torah as a 
guide. The Halachah^ naturally included a large part of the 
law usually covered by a nation's civil and criminal code. Here 
was another point of conflict between the Roman governor and 
the Pharisee. 

Little is known definitely as to the Parthian religious philoso- 
phy; but, as has been said, the Pharisees seemed to feel that 
they received a greater measure of understanding from the 
Parthian than from the Roman, and consequently became loyal 
adherents of the pro-Parthian party. 

Herod himself brought to Rome the news of the disasters 
ensuing from the rapprochement between Pacorus and An- 
tigonus. Hyrcanus and Phaselus had been treacherously cap- 
tured.» The Parthians had plundered Judaea and left Antigonus 
to rule as high-priest and king.^" Herod asked that Aristobulus, 
grandson of Hyrcanus, be made king." He accompanied his 
request with a large sum of money which he had sent to Idumea 
for safekeeping when the Parthians were threatening Jerusa- 
lem.^2 Antony, however, wished to see Herod himself king. 
Roman interests in the East were in a critical position. The 
Parthian invasion and the existence of so strong a pro-Parthian 
party in Judaea made the maintenance of Rome's power in Judaea 
a matter of the highest importance. Neither Antony nor Oc- 
tavian could leave Rome with complications such as there were 
in the city. It seemed better, therefore, contrary to the usual 
Roman custom, to have a strong king rather than a figure-head, 

8The Halachah was the detailed statement of rules of right conduct 
derived from the study of the Torah. Cf. Travers Hereford, Pharisae- 
ism, pp. 95-96. 

^Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 8. 

lojoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 13, 9. While Josephus says "plundered" it 
was really a just levy on a subject province for aid given. Antigonus was 
but little more than a Parthian satrap. 

iijoseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14, 5. 

12/fciU XIV, 36, 4. 



54 University of Missouri Studies 

since he was to be relied upon to further Roman interests even 
at the expense of the enmity of his own people. The hatred of 
Herod was especially strong in those who hated Rome, either 
through Parthian proclivities or because Rome seemed a danger 
to the maintenance of their institutions.^^ Herod, in turn, was 
at enmity with the Parthians, whose power threatened his very 
existence. With this fact set forth as the chief consideration the 
senate constituted Judaea a kingdom and appointed Herod king.^^ 
Thus Herod became a client prince of the Romans as Antigonus 
was of the Parthians, each nation using Judaea as a buffer-state 
against the other. With affairs in this condition in the Orient 
and the Parthians, as Strabo^^ said, "Masters in the East," An- 
tony set out in August or September, 39 B. C.,^® for Athens, 
where he intended to make preparations for his raid into Par- 
thian territory.^'' He planned to winter at Athens^^ while he ar- 
ranged the affairs in the East.^^ His appointment of Amyntus 
was a case parallel to that of Herod. By making this able Gala- 
tian officer king of Pisidia he turned over to him the subjugation 
of that unruly people^" probably because they had undertaken 
another inroad upon Roman territory. Strabo says^^ that it 
seemed best for the suppression of robbers and pirates that 
Pisidia be ruled by a king rather than by a Roman leader who 
would probably not be there at all times^^ nor always under arms. 



i^Radin, Jews among Gks. and Roms., p. 271. 

i4Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14, 4. 

i^XIV, 2, 24: Ti8ri tcov nag^aicov ttjv 'Aoiav dxovTOOv. 

i^Kromayer, Hermes, XXIX, pp. 561-2. 

i7Plut. Ant. ZZ. Dio, XLVIII, 39. 

ispiut. Ant. 33 ; Appian, B. C. V, 75. 

i9Appian B. C. V, 75. 

2oThe tribes in Pisidia, Isauria, and western Cilicia practically main- 
tained their independence until the time of the empire. After the over- 
throw of the Egyptian naval power western Cilicia especially became the 
refuge of pirates. From Amyntus' rule in this place is explained the 
fact that he built himself a residence in Isauria. Strabo, XII, 6, 3; 
Mommsen, Rom. Prov. I, p. 362, n. 1. 

21 Strabo, XIV, 5, 5. 

22The proconsuls traveled on a circuit. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 55 

Amyntus seemed fitted for the task, for he had held a prominent 
position in the government of Galatia under Deiotarus as secre- 
tary and general.^^ As such, he had, before the battle of Philip- 
pi, effected a transition of his country from the side of the "Lib- 
erators" to that of the triumvirs.^^ 

Antony appointed Polemon, son of a rhetorician of Laodicea, 
to the throne of Lycaonia because of his valiant and upright con- 
duct.^^ Zeno, his father, and Hybrias of Mylasa had raised a 
force of soldiers and held their cities against the Parthians.^^ In 
Pontus he re-established the national dynasty by placing on the 
throne Darius, son of Pharnaces and grandson of Mithridates.^' 
His reasons for the appointment of Herod as king of Judaea 
have already been stated. In these appointments it is hardly pos- 
sible to agree with Appian in the statement that "He set up kings 
here and there as he pleased on condition of their paying a pre- 
scribed tribute." ^® Antony seems to have had a very sufficient 
reason in each case in addition to the tribute received. 

Antony does not appear to have had in view, as Mommsen 
states, "the erection of an Asiatic great-kingdom after the model 
of that of Alexander," ^^ and for this reason made all the regions 
of the East once occupied by Occidentals subject to himself in 
the form of satrapies. He was following a policy recognized by 
Caesar^'' and followed later by Octavian,^^ the use of the client 
prince. True to Roman policy, he used these princes in forming 
a chain of buffer-states against the power of Parthia, thus se- 



23Dio, XLIX, 32, says only secretary, but Dio, XL,VII, 48, says gen- 
eral also. 

24Dio, XLVII, 48.. 

25Strabo, XII, 8, 16. 

26Strabo, XIV, 2, 24; Appian, B. C. V, 75. 

27Appian, B. C. V, 75. 

^^Ibid. : loxri 6e Jt^i Jtal ^aaikiaq , oCg SoxitidoEiev , ejii qpoQOig otpa 
TExaYM-Evoig. 

29Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 26. 

3oFor a discussion of Caesar's division of the Asiatic principal cities 
after Zela vid. Judeich, Caesar in Orient, pp. 149 sq. 

3iCf. Mon. Ancyr. 27. 



56 University of Missouri Studies 

curing for himself the security of the Eastern provinces de- 
manded by the capitalists in Rome.^^ 

The time seems long between the spring of the year 40, when 
Antony sailed from Tyre to make preparations for his expedi- 
tion, and the summer of 38, when he returned to Asia, but this 
goes but to show that Antony was striving to maintain his posi- 
tion in Italy at all costs, while the expedition against the Par- 
thians was of secondary importance. 

While in Greece Antony followed the customary methods 
of a Roman general. To obtain funds as well as to keep the 
soldiers in training who were to go with him into winter quar- 
ters, he sent a part of them against the Partheni, an Illyrian 
tribe that had supported Brutus, and defeated them.^^ Another 
division of soldiers was sent against the Dardani, who were con- 
stantly making incursions into Macedonia. The remainder he 
kept within easy reach in Epirus. He sent Furnus to Africa for 
the purpose of bringing four additional legions.^^ 

Meanwhile he collected as much as possible of the tribute 
due. The Peloponnesus had been ceded to Sextus Pompey on 
condition that the tribute then due from it should either be given 
over at once or should be guaranteed by Sextus to Antony.^^ In 
his zeal to collect money it is said that Antony ordered Lachares, 
the richest landholder in the Peloponnesus, to be beheaded on a 
charge of robbery.^® Antony was but following the example of 
his illustrious predecessor in employing such m.eans. Dio Cas- 
sius says that Caesar resorted to assassination to obtain funds.^^ 

When the stormy season interfered with his work outside of 
Greece, Antony gave himself over to a life of pleasure with 
Octavia, just as he had spent the winter of 41-40 with Cleopatra, 
merely looking over the reports sent out from the armies. He 

32Cic. de Imp. Cn. Pomp. VII, 19. 
33Appian, B. C. V, 75. 
s^Ibid. 

35Appian, B. C. V, 77; Dio, XLVIII. 39. 

36Plut. Ant. 67. Cf. Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique, 1896. 
p. 155. 

37XLII, 49. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 57 

exchanged the display of a general for the simplicity of private 
life, wore the Attic dress, took his meals in Greek fashion, and 
attended the lectures and discussions of public teachers. ^^ He 
even went so far as to entitle himself the young Dionysus and 
insisted on being so called by others.^^ This was not an unusual 
practice, for the Dionysiac ritual differed from others in that in 
the common Greek nomenclature attached to it the inspired male 
votary was himself Bctxxog. The spirit of the god was supposed 
to enter into him, and therefore for the time being he bore the 
name.*" 

During the winter had come news of the victory of Ven- 
tidius over the Parthians. He had landed unexpectedly on the 
coast of Asia Minor, where Labienus, with the Roman soldier? 
that had been won to his standards, was ravaging the country 
Labienus was panic stricken and sent urgent messages to Pacorus 
for aid. Ventidius forced him to retreat as far as the Taurus 
range, where he overtook him. Both armies remained in camp 
for several days, for Labienus was awaiting the Parthians and 
Ventidius his heavy armed soldiers. Both arrived on the same 
day. Ventidius, through fear of the much famed Parthian caval- 
ry, remained on the high ground where he was encamped. The 
Parthians, overconfident from their former victories, acted in- 
dependently instead of placing themselves under the command 
of Labienus. They charged up the incline and were easilv 
routed. They then deserted Labienus and fled into Cilicia. Ven- 
tidius, on hearing that the soldiers of Labienus intended to es- 
cape by stealth during the night, laid an ambuscade and killed 
or captured the greater part of them. Labienus himself escaped 
to Cilicia, only to be later captured and put to death.*^ 

After this victory Ventidius regained Cilicia, and, while he 
was reorganizing the country, sent ahead Pompaedius Silo with 

38Appian, B. C. V, 76. 

39Dio, XLVIII, 39; Veil. Pat. II, 82; Athen. IV, 29. 

40Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, V, p. 151. 

«Dio, XLVIII, 39-41 ; Joseph. Antig. Jud. XIV, 15, 1 ; Bell Jud. I, 
15, 3; Flor. Bpit. II, 19; Frontin. Strnteg. II, 5, 36; Macrob. Sat. I, 
11-18; Uv. npit. CXXVII. 



58 University of Missouri Studies 

cavalry*^ to the narrow pass, the Syrian Gates, leading into 
Syria.*^ Here Pacorus had sent a detachment under Pharnapates 
to guard the passage. Pacorus left Antigonus to defend himself 
as best he could against Herod, who was energetically maintain- 
ing his position against the Parthians, and concentrated his forces 
in Northern Syria and Commagene. 

Silo attacked Pharnapates and was on the verge of defeat,^* 
when Ventidius came up and by his aid brought about a victory. 
Pharnapates, with a great number of his followers, was killed. 
On the news of this defeat Pacorus retreated across the Eu- 
phrates for the winter, in order to prepare for a renewal invasion 
of Syria in the spring.*^ 

In Palestine Ventidius did little to aid Herod. Josephus*® 
even accuses him of coming merely for the purpose of extracting 
money from Antigonus. Ventidius was following the principles 
of strategy in striking the main body rather than the small divi- 
sions. 

The campaign of the fall of 39 ended with Ventidius in pos- 
session of all Syria except the district of the Aradii, who were 
holding out desperately in fear of punishment for the murder of 
Antony's legates.*^ On the news of these victories Antony in- 
stituted a public festival throughout Greece in thanksgiving.*^ 

At the opening of the spring of 38 Antony laid aside all 
frivolity and continued with his preparations. Lictors, army 
officers, and guards appeared. Embassies were received that 
formerly had been kept waiting, law suits were decided, ships 

42Dio, XLVIII, 41. 

*^Ihid. Dio says that the pass was so narrow that a wall and gates 
were once built across it ; hence the name. 

**Frontin. Strateg. II, 5, 37, says the retreat was planned as a ruse. 
He also spells the name Pharnastanis. 

45Hor. Carm. Ill, 6. 

*^Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 14, 6. Josephus never displays a clear 
comprehension of military tactics. 

47Dio, XLVIII, 41. 

48Plut. Ant. 33. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 59 

launched, and all the work preparatory for the campaign set in 
motion.*^ 

Everything was at last in readiness for the retaliatory raid 
into Parthian territory. Each side was awaiting the opening of 
spring to begin hostilities. Much to Antony's irritation, at this 
most inopportune time, word came from Octavian asking him to 
come to Brundusium for a consultation. War with Sextus Pom- 
pey seemed imminent, and Octavian was in need of assistance. 
The summons could not have come at a time more ill-suited to 
Antony's interest. Nevertheless he set sail for Brundusium and 
arrived there on the day appointed. Antony was not yet ready 
for a break with Octavian. He needed the prestige which he 
hoped to gain from a victorious Parthian campaign. Further- 
more he was still lacking in funds. 

Octavian did not appear. Antony wasted no time in waiting, 
but, leaving a note for Octavian advising him not to violate their 
previous arrangement, sailed back to Greece.^" Appian^^ gives 
several reasons that may be assumed for his hasty departure: 
either that he did not approve of the war, because he considered 
it a violation of the treaty of Misenum ; or that he saw the great 
preparations of Octavian which he judged to be indicative of a 
future struggle for supreme power ; or that he was frightened at 
the prodigy of a wolf, which entered the camp and devoured one 
of his guards all except the face.^^ It seems clear, however, that, 
when Antony had made every preparation for his Parthian cam- 
paign, upon the success of which he felt that the stability of his 
power rested, he would seize upon any pretext to avoid becoming 
embroiled in a war with Sextus that would, in all probability, 
postpone his own active participation in the affairs of the Orient 
for a year and leave too great an opportunity for glory to his 
lieutenant, Ventidius, reports of whose further success had al- 
ready reached him. Hostilities between Ventidius and Pacorus 
had begun unusually early in the season. In fact, Ventidius 

soDio, XLVIII, 46; Appian, B. C. V, 78-79. 

615. C. V, 79. 

52Dio, XLVIII, 46; Appian, B. C. V, 79. 



60 University of Missouri Studies 

heard that Pacorus was ready to invade Syria before his own 
troops were assembled from winter-quarters. By false reports 
circulated among the Parthians he led them to cross the Euphra- 
tes considerably lower down the stream, and in this way forty 
valuable days were consumed which he used in collecting his 
own forces.^^ 

Ventidius took a position on high ground at some distance 
from the river in Cyrrhesticia, offering no resistance to Pacorus' 
crossing nor taking the offensive after it had been accomplished. 
Once more the Parthians became over-confident and assumed the 
offensive. They approached the Roman defenses and boldly 
charged up the hill. The Romans made a sudden sally, and the 
enemy, taken at a disadvantage, were driven down the hill. Pa- 
corus was slain. For a time his personal guard defended his 
body, but, when these too had fallen, the rest gave way and fled 
in all directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by which 
they had crossed the river, but were cut off and slain. The re- 
mainder took refuge with Antiochus, king of Commagene.^* By 
the Parthian defeat the death of Crassus .was avenged.^^ 

With the expedition of Labienus and Pacorus, terminated 
any advance of the Parthian dominion toward the west. So far 
the Arsacids had adopted the Roman policy, following aggres- 
sion by aggression in its effort to push the Western boundary to 
the coast of the Aegean and the Mediterranean; but from the 
defeat of Pacorus their policy became defensive rathei' than of- 
fensive. The Parthian method of warfare was suited for defense 
on the broad plains of inner Asia, but ineffective for offense in 
the rougher regions near the coast. The Parthians seemed un- 
able to adapt their military system to changed conditions. It re- 
mained the same throughout their entire history. The Romans, 
on the contrary, were always ready to adapt their mode of war- 

s^Frontin. Strateg. I, 1, 6. 

54Flor. II. 19; Dio, XLIX, 20; Strabo, XVI, 2, 8; Plut. Ant. 34; 
Just. XLII, 4; Livy, Epit. CXXVIII. 

s^The defeat of Pacorus is said to have taken place on the anni- 
versary of the defeat of Crassus. Dio, XLIX, 21; Eutrop. VII, 5; 
Oros. VI, 18,23. 11 Jf 



Antony's Oriental Policy 61 

fare to meet new situations. By a modification of their tactics 
the Romans compelled the Parthians to give up hope of dominion 
in the west.^^ 

Ventidius easily reduced the rest of Syria, for its allegiance 
to the Parthians was based largely upon the personal influence 
of Pacorus, whose administration had been just and mild.^^ He 
then turned his forces against Antiochus at Samosata, both be- 
cause he had not delivered up the fugitive Parthians and because 
of the opportunity for vast plunder in his rich kingdom. The 
king entered into negotiations with Ventidius and offered to pay 
an indemnity of a thousand talents. Ventidius came to no terms 
with him, however, but awaited the heralded arrival of Antony.^^ 

Meanwhile Antony had set out from Greece amid great 
pomp and ceremony. He took a crown of sacred olive in con- 
formity to an oracle,^^ and filled a vessel with water from the 
Clepsydra^° to carry with him.®^ On his arrival in Asia he or- 
dered Macherus to go to the assistance of Herod with a consid- 
erable force. The adherents of Antigonus had resisted every 
effort of Herod, confident of the final supremacy of their patrons, 
the Parthians. The Romans had been able to give Herod but 
little assistance, occupied as they were in their efforts to regain 
their power in Asia. Josephus claims that Macherus was bribed 
into inaction by Antigonus.^^ Herod, therefore, determined to 
make a personal appeal to Antony himself.^^ The time seemed 

56Cf. Rawlinson, Parth., pp. 198-200. 

"Dio, XLIX, 20. 

sspiut. Ant. 34; Dio, XLIX, 20. 

^^The sacred olive grew near the Erechtheum on the AcropoHs. 

^''Paus. mentions a fountain of the Acropolis near the Propylaea. 
A spring still flows there, enclosed in a chapel in the rock on the north- 
west face of the Acropolis. 

eiPlut. Ant. 34. 

^^Antig. Jud. XIV, 15, 7. Josephus is too ready to attribute the 
Roman lack of success in Judaea to bribery. It must be remembered 
that the Romans were unable to concentrate there, that there were large 
numbers of Jews in the Oriental party supporting Atigonus, and that 
the natural defences of Jerusalem were excellent. Strabo, XVI, 2, 40, 
describes the difficulty of a siege. 

63Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 7. 



62 University of Missouri Studies 

opportune, for Antony had assumed command at the siege of 
Samosata but had met with far less success than he had antici- 
pated. After the first refusal of terms by Ventidius the people 
had set to work desperately on the defense of the town. Their 
efforts had met with such success that Antony had made but lit- 
tle progress. Herod arrived with a cavalry and infantry force of 
his own and a division which he had persuaded to join him at 
Antioch.®* Soon after the arrival of Herod with these reinforce- 
ments Antiochus delivered up the fortress to Antony, although 
probably paying a smaller indemnity than was originally de- 
manded. ^^ The fall of Samosata closed the season's campaign. 
Here has been found another instance of Antony's good 
judgment in fostering the power of the Idumeans. Herod had 
come to Antony when aid was urgently needed. He had recog- 
nized the principle of military tactics whereby the completion of 
the main campaign is required before troops can be sent to a less 
important one. As a reward for his services Antony despatched 
Sosius to Judaea to see that the campaign there was carried on 
with expedition,^^ as a part of his duty as governor of Syria and 
Cilicia.*'^ Furthermore, Antony appointed Canidius to carry on 

6*Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 8. 

esPlut. Ant. 34 ; Oros. VI, 18, 23. Dio, XLIX, 22, says that Antony 
received neither hostages nor money, but granted Antiochus the death of 
Alexander, who had deserted to the Romans. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 
15, 9, says that in a little time after Herod's arrival with aid, Antiochus 
delivered up the fortress, stating nothing as to lessened indemnity and 
implying that Herod's aid brought the siege to a successful close. Since 
the source of military affairs in Plutarch is probably Dellius, one of An- 
tony's lieutenants, it might seem that more reliance should be placed on 
his account, but it must be remembered that he deserted Antony and 
became a staunch adherent of Octavian, so that he would be ready at all 
times to assign as little success as possible to Antony. 

eejoseph. Aniq. Jud. XIV, 15, 9; Oros. VI, 18, 23. 

67Dio, XLIX, 22 ; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 6. Oros. VI, 18, 23, 
states that Antony placed Ventidius in charge of Syria wtih instructions 
to carry on war against Antigonus; but this is obviously a mistake, for 
Ventidius celebrated his triumph that fall at Rome. CIL,. Acta Triumpha, 
716, Nov. 28. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 63 

offensive warfare in Armenia.®^ He sent Ventidius to Rome to 
enjoy a triumph after bestowing upon him suitable decorations. 

The enthusiasm at Rome was unbounded. The senate voted 
Antony a triumph in accordance with the law, for he was com- 
mander; but it voted one also to Ventidius, for it felt that he 
had paid the Parthians in full for the death of Crassus by the 
death of their prince, Pacorus.^^ Fate decreed that the first 
man'^° to celebrate a triumph at Rome over the Parthians had 
once been led captive in a triumphal procession through these 
very streets, '^^ 

In order to be in easy communication with both Italy and 
Asia, Antony decided to winter in Greece.'^^ It was imperative 
for Antony to maintain his position in Italy. The lesser cam- 
paigns in Asia could well be entrusted to his subordinates, while 
the loss of influence due to his absence during a campaign would 
endanger his power at Rome. Caesar had followed this same 
plan when he was proconsul in Gaul, leaving the legions in win- 
ter quarters under his lieutenants while he himself hastened into 
Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar also furnished a precedent for Antony 
in leaving Sextus Caesar to carry on the work of reorganization 
in Asia when there was need of his own presence elsewhere.''^ 

The present time was most suited to make Antony's author- 
ity dominant at Rome, for Octavian had disregarded Antony's 
note left for him at Brundusium in favor of peace with Sextus 
Pompey, and, as a consequence, his fleet had been destroyed off 

espiut. Ant. 34. 

69Dio, XLIX, 21; Flor, II, 19; Plut. Ant. 34. 

^operrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 278, states that 
Asinius Pollio celebrated a triumph over the Parthians, Oct. 25, 39 B. C. 
He mistakes the tribe of the Partheni for the Parthians. 

'^iVell. Pat. II, 65. For references to the triumph celebrated by 
Ventidius vid. Val. Max. VI, 9, 9 ; Plin. A^. H. 7, 44 Plut. Ant. 34 ; Suet, 
quoted in Gellius, XV, 4; CIL. Acta Triumpha, 716; Nov. 28; Juv. Sat. 
VII, 199; old epigram given in Gellius, XV, 4; Eutrop, VII, 5; Dio, 
XUX, 21. 

72Plut. Ant. 34. 

''Well. Alex. 66, Dio, XLVIII, 26; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 9, 2; 
Bell. Jud. I, 10, 5. 



64 University of Missouri Studies 

ScyllaJ* His funds were low, and he feared to levy new taxes 
because of the ill-feeling toward him already manifest in Italy /^ 
In so difficult a situation, the support of Antony was imperative. 

Furthermore the year 38 B. C. marked the end of the five- 
year agreement among Octavian, Lepidus,,^nd Antony J® The 
triumvirate could hardly be renewed without discussion among 
the colleagues. In addition to this Antony wished to exchange 
his fleet, which was but an added expense and of which Octavian 
was in need, for a part of the legionaries of Octavian, which he 
required.''^ For these reasons Antony felt the necessity of leav- 
ing the winter campaign to his subordinates and returning to 
Greece. 

Octavian recognized the strength of Antony's position and 
resolved to send to him at Athens, Maecenas, Cocceius, and Fon- 
teius Capito to treat and, if possible, to arrange for a renewal of 
the triumvirate.'^^ What message Maecenas brought back with 
him from Greece is uncertain. It is probable that Antony agreed 
to some sort of alliance and promised assistance.'^® Appian^" 
says that, on receipt of the message, Octavian cast off his de- 
spondency and set to work building ships. Relying on Antony's 
support in case of trouble, he dared to raise money by renewed 
taxation.^^ Octavian's efforts at preparation met with such suc- 
cess that he assumed a far different attitude toward Antony in 
the spring of 37 B. C. Octavian feared that his own position in 
Italy would be greatly weakened by showing too open a de- 
pendence on Antony. He had done all in his power to put him- 
self in a position to demand favorable terms from Antony, for 
he knew that Antony would be eager to be back in the Orient 
and that forces for his expedition and freedom from worry over 
political affairs in Italy were essential. Accordingly, when An- 

74Appian, B. C. V, 85-90; Dio, XLVIII, 47-48. 

"Appian, B. C. V, 92. 

76Appian, B. C. IV, 2. 

''■'Ibid. V, 93. 

78Appian, B. C. V, 92; Hor. Sat. I, 5, 32. 

79Appian, B. C. V, 93. 

80/fetU 92. 

siDio, XLVIII, 49. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 65 

tony arrived at Tarentum®^ with his three hundred ships/^ Oc- 
tavian postponed his own coming and offered numerous pretexts 
for the delay. Antony persisted in his efforts, for he wished to 
effect the exchange of ships for the needed soldiery. At this 
crisis Octavia acted as mediator, and Octavian finally agreed to 
an interview.^* The triumvirate was renewed for a period of 
five years dating from January 1, 37 B. C.®^ The reconciliation 
was but a mutual pretence, and none felt it to be more so than did 
Antony.*® 

It was with but little satisfaction that Antony set sail for 
Syria, leaving Octavia with her brother.*^ The events that had 
just transpired had a marked influence on Antony's future con- 
duct in the Orient. From the overbearing manner in which Oc- 
tavian had acted, Antony came to a realization of the power his 
rival had gained both from his absence from Italy and from 
his inability to gain funds for the soldiers in Asia, a task which, 
it will be remembered, had been assigned to Antony by the agree- 
ment after Philippi. The bankrupt condition of Asia was not 
appreciated in Italy, and Antony's enemies were all too ready to 
attribute his lack of funds to his excesses while in the East.** 
He realized that the inevitable struggle with Octavian was im- 
minent, but was determined to be as prepared as possible before 
the conflict. These conditions must be kept in mind in a consid- 
eration of his subsequent conduct in the East. 

82Cf. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 293, n. 5. 

ssAppian, B. C. V, 93. 

84/&iU; Plut. Ant. 35. 

85Dio simply states that they granted themselves the chief authority. 
Appian, B. C. V, 95, says they renewed the triumvirate for five years 
without asking the people. Appian, Illyr. 28, says that the triumvirs them- 
selves ordained it but that the people confirmed it. The last statement 
seems the most probable, and the other statements do not contradict it 
The formality of having the law approved by the people gave a legal 
significance to their authority. This sanction could have been obtained 
after Antony had left. 

86Dio, XLVIII, 54. 

87Plut. Ant. 35 ; Dio, XLVIII, 54, says that Antony sent Octavia to 
Italy from Corcyra. She might easily have accompanied him that far 
on his journey. 

sspiut. Ant. 24. 



CHAPTER VI 



THE PARTHIAN EXPEDITION 



Since the agreement reached at Tarentum had promised to 
be of so little advantage to Antony, he could not but feel that, if 
he wished to counteract Octavian's rapidly increasing claims to 
popularity in Italy, haste in the preparations for his Parthian 
expedition was imperative. Everything was in readiness except 
the financial backing necessary for the execution of his project. 

During Antony's absence in Italy, his lieutenants had been 
most successful in their work in the east preparatory to the ex- 
pedition. Publius Canidius, who had been sent against the Iberi- 
ans,^ had conquered them, brought them into an alliance, and 
with their aid had pushed on against the Albanians, whom he 
likewise had overcome.^ In July, 37 B. C, Herod and Sosius 
had captured Jerusalem.^ The fall of Jerusalem was of great im- 
portance to Antony, for it not only placed the troops which had 
been engaged in the siege of this city at his disposal but it also 
furnished him with a small part of those funds for which he had 
such need, since it was only by means of rich gifts that Herod in- 
duced Sosius and his troops to depart.^ On the fall of the city 
Antigonus was put to death, for much as Antony wished to use 
him in a triumph he realized that, as long as a pro-Parthian 
prince of the Hasmonean house was alive, the Jews and Par- 
thians would conspire to replace him upon the throne. Josephus, 
as usual, attributes Antony's decision to Herod's bribes.' This 



iPlut. Ant. 34; Dio, XLIX, 24; Drumann, Gesch. Roms, p. 450. 
Drumann thinks that the king of the Iberians took this stand in the hope 
that Canidius would meet disaster in the continuance of his campaign. 

2Dio, XLIX, 24. 

^Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, Dio, XLIX, 22. For a discussion of the 
date vid. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, pp. 563-571 ; Shurer, Hist. Jews I, p. 
397, n. n. 

^Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 16, 1-3 ; Bell. Jud. I, 17, 9 ; 18, 1-3. 

^Ihid. Antiq. Jud. XIV, 16, 4. 



(66) 



Antony's Oriental Policy 67 

was the first time a Roman had ever ordered the execution of a 
king.^ In addition to this success at Jerusalem, Sosius had con- 
quered the Aradii, who had held out against the Romans most 
resolutely/ 

Immediately on Antony's arrival in Syria in the late fall 
of Til B. C,® he took up again the work of administration which 
he had begun in 41 B. C. Again Plutarch'^ states that Antony 
conducted affairs in a reckless fashion, that he gave tetrarchies 
to private persons, and took kingdoms from many rulers. The 
only example that he cites, however, is Antigonus. For Antony 
to deprive this Parthian client prince of his throne, in order to 
establish the pro-Roman Herod in his place, showed no lack of 
judgment.^" 

It is probable that at this time Antony also enforced his 
earlier decision against Ariarathes by establishing Archelaus on 
the throne/^ In 39 B. C. Antony had made Amyntus ruler over 
Pisidia.^^ On the death of Deiotarus, king of Galatia, the rule 
had reverted to his heirs.^^ Antony now took Galatia from them 
and bestowed it, together with Lycaonia and Pamphylia, upon 
the capable Amyntus.^* This was good policy, for Galatia was a 
region of Asia best organized in a military point of view and 



HV^d. Antiq. Jud. XV, 1, 2, where he quotes a passage from a history 
of Strabo not now extant; Dio, XLIX, 22; Plut. Ant. 36; Zonar. 5, 11; 
Hegesip. I, 31. 

7Dio, XLIX, 22. 

^For a discussion of the date vid. Biircklein, Rom.-parth. Feldsuge, 
p. 24. 

^Ant. 36. 

loQardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 292, following the view of Plutarch, 
cites the case of Lysanias, son of Ptolemy, king of Iturea (Dio, XLIX, 
2>2). He too was charged with giving aid to the Parthians, (Joseph. 
Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 1), perhaps unjustly, but Antony cannot be censured 
for taking drastic measures against him, since at least he was on inti- 
mate terms with Antigonus. (Bouche-Leclerq, Lag. II, p. 254.) 

"Vid. supra, p. 49, n. 77. 

i2Vid. supra, p. 91. 

"Dio, XLIII, Zi. 

^^Ibid. XUI, 32; Plut. Ant. 61; Strabo, XII, 5, 1. 



68 University of Missouri Studies 

most ready for action.^^ Indeed the Romans always found its 
race of fighting men both useful and congenial and under the 
empire recruited largely from them.^® Therefore, in preparing 
for his Parthian raid, it was essential for Antony to have the 
Galatians under a ruler upon whom he could depend. 

Everything now seemed in readiness for the campaign, with 
the exception of financial backing. Antony had become con- 
vinced that all his efforts to secure funds had been inadequate. 
These sovereigns whom he had established could furnish him 
with but little in comparison with his needs, for, as has been 
shown,^^ Asia was bankrupt. A most convincing proof of An- 
tony's desperate need of money is the debased coinage which he 
issued at this time.^^ He had tried every expedient to finance his 
expedition in the years since the winter of 41-40, when his hope 
of gaining unlimited resources through an alliance with Cleopatra 
had failed.^^ As a last expedient to attaining his ultimate goal of 
supreme power at Rome, Antony was forced into a marriage 
with Cleopatra. The changed attitude of Octavian, the unsatis- 
factory settlement at Tarentum, and his own bankrupt condition 
had brought matters to a crisis. Antony realized that the inevi- 
table conflict with Octavian could not long be postponed and that 
before an open conflict should take place he must regain his pop- 
ularity with the Roman populace. The only sure means seemed 
to be a successful raid into Parthian territory and the regaining 
of the standards lost by Crassus. With these considerations in 
mind, therefore, he sent Fonteius Capito to Alexandria to bring 
Cleopatra to Antioch.^" 



i^Mommsen, Rom. Prov. I, p. 363. 

isArnold, Rom. Imp., pp. 229-230. 

I'^Vid. supra, p. 63. 

"Pliny, N. H. XXXIII, 46. 

i^Vid. supra, p. 76. 

2opiut. Ant. 36; Bouche-Leclerq, Lag. II, pp. 252 sq., and Gardthau- 
sen, Augustus, II, p. 291, see no other motive in Antony's renewed inter- 
course with Cleopatra than his love for her. Ferrero, Greatness and De- 
cline of Rome, IV, p. 3, sees only a political motive, but thinks this mo- 
tive was to obtain funds for the conquest of all Persia. 



Antonyms Oriental Policy 69 

By a careful study of the coins, Letronne^^ has shown that 
in the beginning of the year 36 B. C. Antony and Cleopatra cele- 
brated their marriage at Antioch with due legal procedure. 
There is also evidence that the legality of this marriage was rec- 
ognized in antiquity, for Plutarch^^ states that at this time An- 
tony had two legal wives. Furthermore by acknowledging Cae- 
sarion as Caesar's heir^^ and thus sanctioning Caesar's relation 
with Cleopatra, Antony showed that he believed that his own 
marriage with her could be considered legal.^* Furthermore, it 
was not after his divorce from Octavia, but in 36 that Antony 
recognized his children by Cleopatra as legal. Clearly, then, 
he had at last acceded to Cleopatra's demand for a legal mar- 
riage. Under no other circumstance would she furnish him with 
funds to finance his expedition. It is important to note, how- 
ever, that the marriage was celebrated without any display or 
ostentation, in a Syrian town, not at Alexandria, that Antony 
did not accept the title of king on his coins, and that he took no 
step to break with Octavia.^^ This seems to indicate that An- 
tony's aim was still to attain supremacy at Rome, not to win an 
empire in the East. With a successful Parthian campaign, with 
which to command popularity at Rome, he would no longer be 
in need of Cleopatra and her wealth. The triumphant Roman 
general could easily ignore the obscure marriage with the Egyp- 
tian queen. It was not until his raid into Parthia ended in fail- 
ure that he gave up hope of supremacy in Rome and, yielding 
to the persuasions of Cleopatra, turned his eyes to a kingdom in 
the Orient. Until that time his entire policy had corresponded 
to that of former Roman generals aspiring to supremacy at Rome. 
Another proof of the legality of the marriage is that Cleopatra 
followed the custom of Egyptian sovereigns when they contracted 

^^Recueil des inscriptions greques et latines de I'Egypte, Paris, 1842- 
1848, II, pp. 90 sq., referred to by Bouche-Leclerq, Lag. II, p. 257, n. 1, 
and by Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, pp. 6-7. 

22Com. Dem. cum Ant. 4. 

23Dio, XLIX, 41. 

2*Kromayer, Hermes, 29, pp. 582-3. 

25Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, V, p. 266. 



70 University of Missouri Studies 

a new marriage, by beginning to count the years of her reign 
from that date.^" 

Now that Antony felt that financial backing for his expedi- 
tion was assured, he hastened his preparations. In return for the 
aid given him by Cleopatra he presented her with the kingdom 
of Lysanias of Chalcis.-^ In the early spring everything was in 
readiness and Antony set out on his campaign, accompanied as 

20Por. Tyr. FGH. Ill, p. 724. For a full discussion of the 
change, in date vid. Bouche-Leclerq, Lag. II, p. 257, n. 1, and Fer- 
rero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, IV, p. 7, n. 2. 

27Por. Tyr. FGH. Ill, p. 724; Dio, XLIX, 32. Sources dis- 
agree concerning the gifts to Cleopatra both as to date and wheth- 
er they were all granted at the same time. That the kingdom of 
Lysanias was granted her before September, 36, is generally accepted. 
(Schiirer, Hist. Jews, p. 402; Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 575; Gardthau- 
sen, Augustus, I, p. 292; Bouche-Leclerq, Lag. II, p. 256.) Plutarch, 
Ant. 36, places the entire gift and the recognition of the twin children in 
36 before the Parthian expedition. Dio (XLIX, 32) places the entire 
gift and the recognition of the twin children and also that of Ptolemy in 
36, but after the expedition. Josephus, Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 1-2, divides the 
gifts and puts the date in 34 in connection with the summons of Herod to 
Laodicea to answer for the murder of Aristobulus. Schiirer, Hist. Jews, 
p. 402, n. 5; p. 344, accepts Josephus. Gardthausen, Augustus, I, 292, 
seems to accept Plutarch without discussion. Bouche-Leclerq, Lag. II, 
p. 255, follows Plutarch without discussion of the date. In an article on 
Herod in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopddie, Kromayer's investigations 
are discussed and accepted. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, 
IV, p. 9, accepts Kromayer without discussion. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, 
pp. 571-585, places the donations in 36 before the Parthian expedition. 
He attributes the difference in time between Dio and Plutarch to Dio's 
carelessness in the chronology within the year. However he fails to note 
one other point of difference between Dio and Plutarch. In the recogni- 
tion of Antony's children as legitimate, Plutarch includes only the twins. 
Dio includes Ptolemy, who was probably born during the Parthian expe- 
dition. It seems that Dio did not place the recognition of the children 
and the donations after the raid into Media because of carelessness in 
chronology but because he wished to include Ptolemy. It seems that the 
birth of a child after the legal marriage would be a most suitable occa- 
sion for the recognition of all three children as legitimate, a step upon 
which Cleopatra was most likely to insist. Therefore I follow Kromayer 
in placing the donations in the year 36, but I accept Dio rather than Plu- 
tarch in putting the date after the Parthian expedition. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 71 

far as the Euphrates by Cleopatra.^* Practically all modern his- 
torians maintain that Antony opened his campaign too late in 
the year,2» and on the authority of Livy^*^ attribute the delay to 
his desire to remain as long as possible with Cleopatra. Kro- 
mayer, on the contrary,''^ has proved that Antony entered upon 
his campaign even earlier than preceding Roman commanders, 
since he arrived at Zeugma in February or March. 

Furthermore, even before his actual departure, he was busily 
engaged in negotiations with the Parthian noble Monaeses. On 
the death of Pacorus, the king Orodes had abdicated in favor of 
his son, Phraates.^^ There ensued a series of atrocities, begun 
by the murder of all possible claimants to the throne. Since any 
of the nobility who ventured to protest were executed, many 
prominent men, among them Monaeses, fled to Antony for pro- 
tection.^^ He represented to Antony that, with Roman support, 
he could easily overcome the Parthians. Antony was greatly 
impressed by his proposals, and an agreement was reached.^* 
Meanwhile, Phraates, seeing that he had carried his persecu- 
tions to a point dangerous to himself, had come to terms with 
Monaeses. Antony learned of the infidelity of Monaeses, but, in 
order to take the Parthians the more unprepared, sent him back 
to Parthia to negotiate with the king, as if he still believed him 
faithful to Roman interests.^^ Antony himself, however, entered 
into negotiations with Artavasdes, King of Armenia.^® These 
negotiations terminated in his decision to attack the territory of 

28Plut. Ant. 37; Joseph. Bell. Jud. I, 18, 5; Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 2; 
Strabo, XI, 13, 4. 

29Drumann, Gesch. Ronis, I, 453; Rawlinson, Parth., p. 201; Momm- 
sen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 30; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 293; Bouche- 
Leclerq, Lag. II, p. 255. 

3oH/)t7. 130. 

3iHermes, 31, pp. 90-101. 

32Dio, XLIX, 24; Justin, XLII, 4; Head, Hist. Num., p. 694. 

33Plut. Ant. 37; Dio, XLIX, 24. 

3*/&tU 

35/&tU; Flor. II, 20; IV, 10. 

36Head, Hist. Num., p. 636; Dio, XUX, 25. 



72 University of Missouri Studies 

the king of Media Atropatene, a Parthian client prince,^'' who, 
by joining his troops to those of the Parthians on guard at the 
Euphrates frontier, had left his country practically undefended. 

In execution of this plan Antony turned to the north on 
reaching the Euphrates, instead of crossing the river as the 
Parthians had expected. In order to take Media Atropatene the 
more unprepared, Antony divided his troops. To Oppius Sta- 
tianus he entrusted the baggage train and siege batteries, while 
he proceeded by forced marches toward Praaspa, the capital of 
Media Atropatene.^^ He at once laid siege to the stronghold. 
The Median king returned to the defense of his country, but, 
instead of attempting to relieve the siege, made a surprise attack 
on Statianus. The Roman leader was defeated and slain with 
ten thousand of his men, and the baggage train and siege-engines 
were captured.^^ Even more disastrous for Antony than the loss 
of this division of his army was the desertion of Artavasdes. 
who, inspired either by treachery or by fear that Antony's expe- 
dition was destined to failure, withdrew his troops and left An- 
tony without the support of his all-essential cavalry .*° 

Antony, nevertheless, continued to push the siege, until his 
supplies began to fail and he was forced to send his foraging 
parties to such a distance that they were frequently attacked and 
destroyed by the enemy .*^ Consequently, feeling compelled to 
relinquish the siege and retreat to Armenia before winter set in, 
he began to retire to the Araxes,*^ guided by a Mardian who was 
well acquainted with the country. Under constant attack from 
the Parthians and suffering from cold and lack of food and 

37Dio, XUX, 25. 

38Plut. Ant. 38; Dio, XUX, 25. 

39Plut. Ant. 38. 

*oPlut. Ant. 39; Dio, XLIX, 25. Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 294, 
sees no trace of treachery. Bouche-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 258, n. 2, 
follows Strabo, XI, 13, 4, and Plut. Ant. 50, in accepting treason as the 
cause. H. Rawlinson, Geographical Journal, X, pp. 113-117, identifies 
Praaspa with the modern Takht-i-Suleiman. Dio uses the name Phraaspa 
or Praaspa, and Plutarch Phrasta. 

4iDio, XLIX, 26. 

42Plut. Ant. 41; Dio, XLIX, 28; Frontin. Strateg. IV, 1, 2,7. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 73 

water, he fought his way back to Armenia,^^ but did not winter 
in that country, choosing rather to push on into Syria, where 
he was met by Cleopatra with money and suppHes for the army.** 
Here he left the army in winter quarters and departed with the 
queen for Alexandria.*^ 

In a discussion of Antony's expedition against Parthia, it is 
necessary to keep in mind the purpose that he had in view. Mod- 
ern historians, without exception, see in this expedition a great 
campaign of conquest for the purpose of completely overthrow- 
ing the power of Parthia.*^ It seems, however, from a consider- 
ation of Antony's earlier conduct in relation to the expedition 
and from a careful observation of various phases of the ex- 
pedition itself, that this could not have been his purpose. The 
postponement of the expedition whenever affairs of importance 
seemed to need his personal supervision at Rome, the point of 
attack, the route taken, the fact that he did not plan to take up 
winter quarters in Armenia after the campaign, his establish- 
ment of buffer-states along the frontier instead of forming the 
territory into Roman provinces, the fact that he had planned 
for the construction of no great military roads or for placing 
troops on permanent garrison duty throughout the border terri- 
tory, all seem to point to the expedition's being a razzia into the 
territory of a Parthian client prince rather than a great campaign 
of conquest.*'^ 

Conditions in the Roman empire demanded such a frontier 
policy. By the end of the republic Rome had reached the great 
permanent boundaries of her empire, with but two exceptions, 
Armenia on the northeast and Germany on the northwest. On 
the northeast was the great Taurus range, whose trend is in the 
main east and west, so that neither the crest of a long line of 

43Plut. Ant. 41-50; Livy, Bpit. 130. 

44Plut. Ant. 51; Livy, Bpit. 130; Dio, XUX, 82; Veil. Pat. II, 82; 
Flor. IV, 10. 

45Appian, B. C. V, 133 ; Dio, XLIX, 32. 

^^Mommsen, Rom. Prov. II, p. 30; Kromayer, Hermes, 31, p. 90. 

*'''For a discussion of this policy vid. Illinois Studies, June, 1915, Old- 
father and Canter, The Defeat of Varus. 



74 University of Missouri Studies 

mountains nor the course of a large river supplied a satisfactory 
north and south line between the Roman and Parthian empires.*^ 
As has been seen, Rome had adopted the plan of protecting this 
frontier by a series of buffer-states under the rule of native 
princes dependent upon Rome for their authority. That Parthia 
had followed the same policy has been shown in the case of Pales- 
tine and the other Syrian states. Media Atropatene was also a 
Parthian buffer-state. 

Parthia had gone farther than the establishment of these 
buffer-states. To maintain her influence as supreme, she had 
sent troops into the territory under the protection of Rome. By 
the successful raids of these forces Parthia had materially in- 
creased her influence. Antony had in mind a similar plan, a re- 
taliatory raid into Parthian territory. 

Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in 
antiquity without any attempt whatsoever to make the conquest 
permanent.^^ Caesar had employed this policy both in his raid 
into Britain and into Germany. It was also in all probability 
such a raid that he planned to make into Parthia. Octavian was 
following the same policy later in his expedition into Arabia, 
25-24 B. C, where there is no evidence that a permanent seizure 
of the land was contemplated, the main purpose being rather to 
make a demonstration of the vigor of the new Egyptian adminis- 
tration.^° In the invasion of Dacia, 12-9 B. C, and the later 
raids during the Pannonian revolts, 6-9 A. D., Octavian merely 
wished to assert the authority of Rome without any intention 
of making additions to the territory of the Empire .^^ The suc- 
cess of these expeditions tended to promote his popularity at 
home as well. 

Antony likewise wished to demonstrate the renewed stabili- 
ty of Roman rule in the Orient and, by a victory over the Par- 
thians, to gain favor at Rome upon which he might depend later 

^^Illinois Studies, June, 1915, Oldfather and Canter, The Defeat of 
Varus, p. 83. 

^^Ibid., pp. 105-106. 

soQldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, June, 1915, pp. 106-107. 

si/fctU, p. 107. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 75 

in his conflict with Octavian for supreme power. Antony v/as 
merely following a policy which Caesar had adopted before him 
and which Octavian favored after him. 

The first objection to Antony's expeditions^ ^g a great cam- 
paign of conquest upon the success of which he based his hopes 
of an empire in the Orient, is the postponement of this expedition 
every time affairs at Rome seemed to need his attenton. First, 
in the spring of 40 B. C, when the raid of Pacorus and Labienus 
made the need of Roman support in Asia imperative, Antony left 
his interests in the Orient to take care of themselves as best they 
might, while he himself hastened to Italy to adjust the difficulties 
threatening his power there. He remained away from the East 
from the spring of 40 B. C. until the summer of 38 B. C. If his 
aim had been supreme power in the East rather than in Italy, it 
seems strange that he should have spent so long a time in Italy 

52The sources for the Parthian campaign can be traced back to a cer- 
tain Dellius, who took part in the campaign with Antony. Strabo, XI, 
13, 3, cites as his authority for a statement, "Dellius, the friend of An- 
tony, who wrote an account of Antony's expedition against the Parthians 
in which he himself took part and held a command" : (wg cpr]ai\ 6 MlXiog 
6 Tov 'Avtcoviou (pikoz, avyyQ6.'\\?ai; ttiv im, Ilaodwaioug auxoxi oxQaxEiav, 
§v f\ KaQf\v %ox avTog f|Ye|Aoviav e'xoov). After he had taken an impor- 
tant part in Antony's administration of the Orient (Plut. Ant. 25; Joseph. 
Antiq. Jud. XIV, 15, 1; Ibid. XV, 2, 6; Strabo, XI, 13, 3; Dio, XUX, 
39) he deserted him for Octavian just before the battle of Actium, when 
he feared Antony's cause was hopeless (Dio, L, 13; Veil. Pat. II, 84; 
Plut. Ant. 59). He bought his pardon from Octavian by a betrayal of 
Antony's plans. He seems to have gained entrance into Octavian's circle 
of literary friends (Sen. de Clem. I, 10; Hor. Carm. II, 3). Conse- 
quently he was ready to follow the example of the other writers of the 
day in lessening any odium that might fall upon Octavian as a result of 
the fate of the less fortunate Triumvir by emphasizing the fault of the 
"Egyptian Woman." Likewise he feU that he had need of justifying his 
betrayal of Antony and therefore probably exaggerated the sufferings of 
the army and laid the blame for the disaster to poor management on 
Antony's part. (Cf. Bouche-Leclerq, Htst. Lag., p. 261, n. 1.) The story 
furnished excellent rhetorical matter for the later writers and grew with 
the years. (Flor., II, 20; Serv. ad Aen. VIII, 678; Oros. XIX, 1-2.) 
For a discussion of Dellius vid. Biircklein, Quell, imd Chron. der rom- 
parth. FeldsUge, pp. 7-15. 



76 University of Missouri Studies 

rather than in the Orient, especially when the Parthian victories 
were weakening the power of Rome in that part of the empire.^^ 
Again, in the spring of 38 B. C. he did not sail directly from 
Greece in order to open his campaign in Asia seasonably, but at 
the bidding of Octavian returned first to Italy. Although he 
did not linger there, much valuable time was lost. In the spring 
of 37 B. C. he returned to Italy again in an endeavor to protect 
his interests there before entering upon his long postponed Par- 
thian expedition. Antony's readiness to defer this expedition 
whenever affairs of importance seemed to make his presence at 
Rome advisable seems to point to the fact that it was supremacy 
in Italy rather than in the Orient for which he was planning and 
that the Parthian campaign was but a means to this end, a means 
to be employed only when best suited to further his interests in 
Rome. 

In Antony's point of attack, the Parthian buffer-state. Media 
Atropatene, modern historians have seen the predominant influ- 
ence of the Armenian king, with whom Antony was allied. Con- 
sequently, they consider the choice of this objective as his first 
grave mistake.^* They picture Antony as duped by Artavasdes, 
who wished to turn the attack on Media to his own personal ad- 
vantage. Mommsen^^ considers the direction that Antony chose 
most surprising, since all aggression of the Romans against the 
Parthians, both earlier and later, took the route for Ctesiphon, 
which was the capital of the kingdom and so situated on the fron- 
tier that it was the natural aim of operation for armies march- 

^^Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, III, p. 245, n. 2, finds the 
cause of Antony's departure for Italy and the consequent postponement 
of the Parthian expedition in h's need for the troops that were then in 
Italy. This explanation neither accounts for his long stay in Italy nor 
for the fact that he himself went to Italy for the troops instead of en- 
trusting their transportation to a lieutenant while he took command 
against the Parthians who were so seriously threatening the power of 
Rome. This plan would have been more in accordance with the example 
set by Caesar before the battle of Dyrrachium. 

5*Bouche-Leclerq, Hist. Lag. II, p. 258; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, 
pp. 293-4; Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 201. 

^^Rom. Prov. II, p. 30. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 77 

ing downward on the Euphrates or Tigris. He thinks that Antony 
may have wished to push forward from Atropatene into the 
heart of the enemies' country, but that if this was his purpose, he 
both acted without knowledge of the difficult ground and under- 
estimated the strength of his opponents. This objective, how- 
ever, has many points in its favor, especially if the attack is con- 
sidered as a razzia. This point of attack had been suggested to 
Crassus by Artavasdes but had not been accepted. After the 
crushing defeat of Crassus, the plan which he did not adopt 
must have been thoroughly discussed and probably considered in 
a rather favorable light in view of the disastrous result attendant 
upon its rejection. Caesar, on the contrary, accepted this plan, 
and it was therefore Caesar's plan as well as that of Artavasdes 
which Antony followed.^® Caesar had excellent reasons for his 
choice. First, the way to Ctesiphon lay through open country in 
part desert, where the army was always exposed to attack by the 
Parthian cavalry. On the other hand, that part of the route to 
Phraaspa which was not through the friendly Armenia lay 
through a country which, although hostile to the Romans, was 
unfavorable to the Parthian cavalry. Second, in the case of the 
objective adopted, supplies were abundant,^'^ while, as has been 
said, in the other case the route lay in part through desert land. 
Third, it was only with Phraaspa as the point of attack that 
Artavasdes would furnish the all-important Armenian cavalry 
which was experienced in Parthian methods of warfare. Fourth, 
in case of a defeat at Ctesiphon, a safe retreat was practically 
impossible because of the desert character of the country and 
of its advantages to the Parthian cavalry, while in case of de- 
feat in Atropatene the country was unfavorable to Parthian meth- 
ods of warfare, and when Armenia was reached there would be 
a protected line of retreat.^^ 

A lack of knowledge can scarcely have been responsible for 
the project. Caesar always based his plan of campaign on a 

seSuet. Caes. 44. 

57Strabo, XI, 13, 3-4. 

58Kromayer, Hermes, 31, pp. 86-90. 



78 University of Missouri Studies 

thorough acquaintance with the topography of the land.^^ As a 
result of the constant warfare between Armenia and Atropatene, 
Artavasdes must have known the country perfectly from a mili- 
tary point of view.''° Caesar probably had gained much valuable 
information from him. Antony himself had probably acquired 
first-hand knowledge of the routes to be pursued when he was 
commander of the horse with Gabinius on his raid against Par- 
thia. As Caesar's trusted lieutenant Antony must have taken an 
important part in the discussions of the Parthian campaign which 
Caesar was planning just before his death. Accordingly, it seems 
hardly possible that Antony chose his objective because of lack 
of knowledge of the land. 

If the campaign is considered as a razzia rather than a cam- 
paign of conquest, the objective seems most suitably chosen. As 
has been shown, the approach lay through a friendly country to a 
point where a rapid march could be made to the objective before 
the enemy was aware of the hostile attack. In case of defeat 
there was a protected line of retreat. The razzias made by the 
Romans were not conducted according to the methods of actual 
campaigns. Pitched battles seldom took place.^^ Their purpose 
was to demonstrate the power of Rome and to show "how far 
beyond the actual frontier its outstretched arm could strike." ^^ 
Consequently one of the first essentials for the success of such a 
raid was rapidity of attack. For this purpose Praaspa was an 
excellent objective. 

Gardthausen®^ is of the opinion that Antony's route is in- 
com.prehensible. This seems hardly true. When Antony reached 
Zeugma, the starting point for his expedition,®* not all of his 
army was mobilized. Part of his legions were with Canadius 
north of Armenia in Iberia. His greatest lack, however, was the 
cavalry force which the Armenians were to furnish him. None 

59Suet. Caes. 53. 

soKromayer, Hermes, 30, p. 87. 

^^Oldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, p. 89, n. 14. 

^^Ihid., p. 88. 

^^ Augustus, II, p. 153, n. 18. 

6*Strabo, XI, 13, 4. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 79 

of the Armenian horse, which was experienced in Parthian meth- 
ods of warfare, was with him in Zeugma,^^ but was to meet him 
either in Armenia itself or on the way to Armenia. Antony's 
first care was to avoid a conflict with the Parthians until his army 
should be entirely mobilized. Therefore it was but natural that 
by turning to the north he was able to avoid an encounter with 
those Parthians who were on guard at the Euphrates.^® His 
whole plan was to make Atropatene the field of campaign, with 
Armenia as the base of supplies, thereby postponing the conflict 
with the enemy until he should be fully prepared. Furthermore, 
by swinging around toward the north and choosing the route 
along the Araxes river, as has been shown, the supplies were as- 
sured for the army, the passage was protected from the attacks 
of the Parthian horse, in which the main strength of the enemy 
consisted, and there was an opportunity for a surprise attack 
while the latter were still on guard at the Euphrates. By adopt- 
ing any other route than the one along the Araxes river, all the 
advantages to be gained by choosing Media as an objective 
would be lost.®'^ 

Historians find a third problem in the haste with which 
Antony carried on his raid. Following Dellius in his desire to 
place a large share of the blame on the baneful influence of Cleo- 
patra over Antony,*'^ modern scholars attribute the disastrous 
outcome of the expedition to Antony's desire to finish the raid 
in the shortest possible time in order to spend the winter in Alex- 
andria with Cleopatra. If the campaign is considered as a raz- 
zia, it seems that a more satisfactory explanation can be found. 
As has been shown, one of the essentials for the success of such 
an expedition was rapidity of attack. The armed force of the 
Romans must appear in the heart of the enemies' territory before 
their proximity was even suspected. Antony planned just such 
an attack. He risked a division of his forces that he might insure 

espiut. Ant. 50. 
66Dio, XUX, 15. 

67Vid. Kromayer, Hermes, 31, pp. 70-90, for a full discussion of the 
route. 

espiut. Ant. 37. 



80 University of Missouri Studies 

this necessary rapidity of action. The failure of the maneuver 
was not due to lack of wisdom in its conception but to the treach- 
ery, or at least to the cowardice, of the Armenian king.*'^ Be- 
cause of a lack of the provisions necessary for a long winter cam- 
paign, Antony was forced to relinquish the siege of Praaspa and 
retire into Armenia. Here again there seems to be evidence that 
he had in mind a retaliatory raid rather than a great campaign of 
conquest. If Antony had spent almost six years in preparation 
for the campaign, it seems hardly probable that he would be 
forced to give up his first objective because of inadequate provi- 
sion for supplies. One and the same explanation can be given 
both for the haste shown in the expedition and for the failure of 
the siege. Antony was not careless in his preparations or hasty 
in the execution of his scheme from a desire to be with Cleo- 
patra. He had in mind a razzia into the Parthian buffer-state 
Atropatene, and this he carried out with energy and despatch. It 
is not to be questioned that he met with great suffering on his 
retreat.''" By the loss of the Armenian cavalry he was forced to 
choose a difficult route through mountainous country in order 
to escape the attacks of the Parthian horse.'^^ The easy line of 
retreat through the plain had been rendered impossible by the 
desertion of the Armenian cavalry.''^ Nevertheless the entire 
plan had been carried out energetically along lines which Antony 
had learned under Caesar, and the risks assumed, such as the 
division of the army, were no greater than Caesar frequently 
took. The ultimate failure of the expedition detracts in no way 
from the brilliance of the plan of campaign as conceived by 
Caesar or from Antony's energy in its execution.''^ 

After the retreat of Antony into Armenia it seems as though 

69Dio, 49, 25 ; Plut. Ant. 38. 

''oDellius, writing to please Octavian, undoubtedly has exaggerated 
the sufferings of the army. The story grew as it was retold. Orosius, 
VI, 19, 1-2, states that he returned to Antioch with only a few men. Vid. 
note 47. 

'■iRawUnson, Geog. Jour. X, pp. 115-117. 

72piut. Ant. 50. 

73Kromayer, Hermes, 31, p. 104. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 81 

he would have taken up winter quarters there preparatory to a 
renewed attack in the spring, had he been planning the conquest 
of Parthia. Instead of doing this, however, in order to winter in 
Syria,''* he braved the dangers of a march through a bleak moun- 
tain country, where he lost many of his men from hunger and 
cold. This seems to be an important indication that Antony 
planned only a retaliatory raid, for in these raids the Romans 
never took up winter quarters in the enemies' territory/^ An- 
cient historians maintain that his return to Syria was due to a 
desire to be with Cleopatra, and many modern historians see 
only this reason for his return, Ferrero^*^ maintaining that An- 
tony had in view the conquest of Persia, but that the political 
situation in the Roman world was such that his absence for a 
longer period was impossible. If Antony had spent five years in 
so arranging his affairs that he could undertake this expedition, 
as Ferrero maintains, it seems that he would have taken into con- 
sideration the necessity of wintering in the interior. Bouche- 
Leclerq^'^ assigns as a reason the fear of further treachery on the 
part of Artavasdes. If the flight of the Armenian cavalary was 
due to treachery rather than actual panic, Artavasdes would be 
only too ready to ward off the punishment which was sure to 
fall to his lot by conciliating Antony in every possible way. The 
risk of treachery on the part of the Armenian king does not seem 
to be a sufficient cause for the exposure of his men to the actual 
dangers of cold and starvation in a winter march across the 
mountains, if Antony had expected to renew his campaign in the 
spring. 

Antony, like the other great Roman leaders, had but two 
ways of dealing with the frontier, "either the constant pushing 
forward of the lines of the empire or the buttressing of the 
frontier by forming a series of buffer-states." '^ In the pursu- 
ance of the latter plan there was need to keep fear of the mili- 

74Plut'. Ant. 51 ; Livy, Epit. 130. 

'i'sOldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, p. 91. 

76 IV, pp. 26-28. 

■'^Hist. Lag. II, p. 261. 

7801dfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, June 1915, p. 85. 



82 University of Missouri Studies 

tary power of Rome constantly in the minds of the people/^ As 
has been shown by numerous examples, the razzia seemed the 
best means of accomplishing this end.^° It has been shown that 
from Antony's first entrance into the Orient he consistently fol- 
lowed the policy of establishing states on the frontier under 
native princes, whose authority rested solely on the authority of 
Rome. It seems only natural that he should continue the line of 
policy thus far established by gaining prestige for Roman arms 
by means of a raid into Parthian territory. Antony had taken 
no steps to form the territory along the frontier into Roman 
provinces, where Roman troops would be stationed on permanent 
garrison duty, nor had he made any efforts to construct in these 
districts the Roman roads so all-important for military success, 
if permanent conquest was in view. In the actual conduct of 
campaigns of conquest such steps were essential.^^ Therefore 
Antony's postponement of the expedition whenever affairs in 
Italy demanded his presence there, his choice of a buffer-state of 
Parthia as the point of attack, his selection of a route by which 
a rapid descent into the enemies' territory could be made without 
their knowledge, the fact that he considered rapidity in attack of 
such importance that he endangered the success of the expedition 
by a division of his troops, his omission to make provisions for 
taking up winter quarters in the interior, and his adoption from 
his entry into the Orient of a policy of defending the frontier by 
establishing buffer-states rather than by pushing forward the 
boundaries of the empire — all are cogent reasons pointing to the 
fact that Antony's expedition into Parthia was a retaliatory raid 
rather than a campaign of conquest. 

With the disastrous termination of the Parthian campaign 
Antony's hope for supremacy at Rome appears to have ended. 
Henceforth all his actions indicate that he felt compelled to base 
his hopes for power on a kingdom in the East, with Egypt as the 
corner-stone. 

Immediately upon Antony's return to Syria, Cleopatra met 

79/fetd., p. 87. 

80Vid. supra, pp. 125-126. 

siQldfather and Canter, Illinois Studies, June, 1915, p. 89. 



Antony's Oriental Policy 83 

him with supplies for the amiy.^^ He no longer made any effort to 
keep his marriage secret, but openly recognized Cleopatra as his 
wife by declaring their three children legitimated^ In addition he 
granted her the central portion of the Phoenician coast, namely 
from the Eleutherus River south to the territory of Sidon,^* the 
balsam lands of Jericho from the kingdom of Herod, and certain 
portions from the kingdom of the Nabateans.®^ After these ar- 
rangements had been made, Antony returned to Egypt with Cleo- 
patra to spend the winter in Alexandria. 

A change in Antony's policy seems clearly evident from this 
time on. The news of his gifts and of his recognition of his 
children by the Egyptian queen created, as Antony could well ex- 
pect, an outspoken feeling against him in Rome.^'^ The astute 
Octavian now adopted a plan whereby Antony would be com- 
pelled to disclose his aims. He sent Octavia to Antony with re- 
inforcements and supplies. On reaching Athens she received 
letters from Antony in which he commanded her to remain there, 
since he was now in Syria preparing for an expedition against 
Armenia. Antony, however, did not carry out this intended 
expedition, but, after he had accepted the gifts which Octavia 
had brought him, remained in Syria for some time with Cleo- 
patra and finally returned to Alexandria in her company.^^ 

Antony had given his answer to Octavian. Heretofore he 
had made every effort to avoid a break with his colleague. Again 
and again he had postponed his Parthian expedition in order to 
maintain his influence at Rome by peaceful means. The repudia- 
tion of Octavia is significant, not alone as a challenge to her 
brother but as an indication that Antony no longer sought pop- 
ularity at Rome. Octavia was one of the most highly revered 
women of Roman history. Antony could not but have realized 

82piut. Ant. 51. 

^^Ibid., 36; Dio, XLIX, 32. 

84joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 12; Bell. Jud. I, 18, 5. 

85The statement that the entire coast from Palestine to Egypt was 
presented is a mistake of Josephus who is our only source for this gift. 
Vid. Kromayer, Hermes, 29, p. 580. 

86Dio, XLIX, 32. 

^nUd. 33; Plut. Ant. 53. 



84 University of Missouri Studies 

the hatred that he would arouse by the insults which he had 
heaped upon her. When it is remembered that upon popularity 
with Roman civilians as well as with the soldiery depended to a 
large extent his success in attaining his goal of supreme power 
at Rome, this change of attitude appears most significant. 

It seems, then, that Antony was determining upon dominion 
in the Orient at the cost of power at Rome. Once having come 
to this decision, it is characteristic of the man that he was as 
zealous in his efforts to antagonize the Romans as before he had 
been eager to conciliate them. After a successful raid into Ar- 
menia for the especial purpose of plunder,^^ Antony placed the 
crowning insult upon the outraged feelings of the Romans by 
celebrating a Roman triumph at Alexandria.*^ At this triumph 
he granted territory to Cleopatra and her children and filled out 
Egypt to the boundaries of its former power, and this, too, at the 
price of such Roman territory as Cilicia and portions of Syria. 
As a further insult to Octavian he proclaimed Caesarion the 
legal heir of Julius Caesar.®° 

With the defeat of the Parthian expedition, by the success 
of which Antony had hoped to establish his popularity at Rome, 
it seems clear that he changed his aim for supreme power at 
Rome to the hope for a kingdom in the East with Egypt at its 
head. His open recognition of Cleopatra as his wife by the 
declaration of their children as legitimate, his large grants of ter- 
ritory to her, his direct answer to Octavian's clever device of 
sending Octavia to him with troops, his conquest of Armenia 
and the subsequent addition of that territory, along with portions 
of the Roman provinces, to Cleopatra's domain, the great triumph 
which he celebrated at Alexandria, and his recognition of Caesa- 
rion as the heir of Julius Caesar, all are evidence that Antony's 
policy in the Orient was no longer that of a Roman general fol- 
lowing in the footsteps of his predecessors in their struggle for 
supremacy at Rome. 

880ros. VI, 19, 4. 

seAppian, B. C. V, 145; Dio, XLIX, 39; Veil. Pat. II, 82; Livy, 
Epit. 131; Tac. Ann. II, 3; Plut. Ant. 50; Plin. N. H. XXXIII, 82; 
Strabo, XI, 14, 16; Joseph. Antiq. Jud. XV, 4, 3. 

sopiut. Ant. 54; Dio, XLIX, 41. 



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